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Abstract
Lately, the problem of designing multi-stage dynamic mechanisms has been shown to be both
theoretically challenging and practically important. In this paper, we consider the problem of
designing revenue optimal dynamic mechanism for a setting where an auctioneer sells a set
of items to a buyer in multiple stages. At each stage, there could be multiple items for sale
but each item can only appear in one stage. The type of the buyer at each stage is thus a
multi-dimensional vector characterizing the buyer’s valuations of the items at that stage and
is assumed to be stage-wise independent. Compared with the single-shot multi-dimensional
revenue maximization, designing optimal dynamic mechanisms for this setting brings additional
difficulties in that mechanisms can now branch on different realizations of previous random
events and secure extra revenue.
In particular, we propose a novel class of mechanisms called bank account mechanisms.
Roughly, a bank account mechanism is no different from any stage-wise individual mechanism
except for an augmented structure called bank account, a real number for each node that
summarizes the history so far. This structure allows the auctioneer to store deficits or surpluses
of buyer utility from each individual mechanism and even them out on the long run. While
such simplicity allows for easy implementation in practice, it turns out it is also sufficient to
guarantee optimal revenue. We first establish that the optimal revenue from any dynamic
mechanism in this setting can be achieved by a bank account mechanism, and we provide a
simple characterization of the set of incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational bank
account mechanisms. Based on these characterizations, we then investigate the problem of
finding the (approximately) optimal bank account mechanisms. We prove that there exists
a simple, randomized bank account mechanism that approximates optimal revenue up to a
constant factor. Our result is general and can accommodate previous approximation results in
single-shot multi-dimensional mechanism design. Based on the previous mechanism, we further
show that there exists a deterministic bank account mechanism that achieves constant-factor
approximation as well. Finally, we consider the problem of computing optimal mechanisms
when the type space is discrete and provide an FPTAS via linear and dynamic programming.
∗Contacts: {mirrokni, renatoppl}@google.com, {kenshinping, songzuo.z}@gmail.com.
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1 Introduction
A wide range of internet advertising applications including sponsored search and advertising ex-
changes employ a sequence of repeated auctions to sell their inventory of page-views or impressions.
In a variety of settings, optimizing revenue for the seller (e.g., the search engine, publishers, or ad-
vertising exchange) boils down to designing auctions that allocate the most effective ads for users,
and at the same time extract enough revenue and result in a stable market without incurring too
much cost to enter the market.
In order to achieve this goal, the seller should provide good incentives for advertisers to reveal
their true values. To cope with this goal, in many settings, advertising exchanges and search
engines enforce incentive compatibility or truthfulness at the level of each individual auction, and
as a result, end up running repeated 2nd-price auctions or variants of repeated Myerson optimal
auctions [Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011].
In these cases, we say that the seller runs a static auction optimizing the social welfare and/or
revenue of each individual auction. Advertisers, in turn, declare their bids for a sequence of such
static auctions and not for one auction. On the other hand, more traditional online advertising
campaigns employ long-term contracts between the seller and buyers which can result in higher
revenue per impression for sellers.
One reason for lower per-impression revenue from the auction-based advertising is that the re-
sulting individual auctions may become too thin [Celis et al., 2014], and therefore, they may lack
enough competition to incur higher prices. More traditional contract-based advertising takes care
of this problem by bundling their impressions together, and achieving higher average revenue per
impression (while keeping the surplus of advertisers positive). Traditional contract-based adver-
tising, on the other hand, does not have several advantages of the auction-based advertising, e.g.,
they incur a high cost for entering the market for smaller advertisers, and may not allow for real-
time fine-tune targeting. A desirable goal is to design a solution that combines the advantages of
auction-based and contract-based advertising. One way to achieve this goal is dynamic mechanisms
which allow for combining several auctions, and optimize seller’s revenue across all auctions.
Motivated by the above discussion, the area of dynamic mechanism design has attracted a large
body of research work in the last decade [Cavallo, 2008, Pai and Vohra, 2008, Pavan et al., 2008,
Cavallo et al., 2009, Gershkov and Moldovanu, 2009, Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2010, Gershkov and
Moldovanu, 2010, Athey and Segal, 2013, Kakade et al., 2013, Papadimitriou et al., 2014, Pavan
et al., 2014] (see [Bergemann and Said, 2011] for a survey). In these settings, unlike repeated
auctions, the pricing and allocation of items in each auction may depend on the history of the bids,
prices, and allocations in the previous auctions. While such dynamic auctions can produce more
revenue for the sellers, a couple of issues has slowed down their adoption in the market. Main issues
with a majority of results in dynamic mechanism design are two-fold:
Complexity: The first issue is the high complexity and impracticality of implementing such
auctions: If the seller is allowed to use the full power of dynamic mechanism design and the price
and allocation of each auction depend on the outcome of all previous auctions, the complexity of
computing the optimal mechanism or even describing a policy could be high. In fact, it has been
recently shown that in some settings computing the optimal dynamic mechanism is computationally
hard [Papadimitriou et al., 2014].
Future commitment and lack of individual rationality. The second issue is that they may
require big initial commitments from buyers and sellers prior to the auction [Kakade et al., 2013].
Although there have been recent movements in adopting such new type of contracts [Mirrokni
and Nazerzadeh, 2015], this issue makes it much harder for buyers and sellers to employ these
mechanisms. In order to get around this issue, it would be desirable to design dynamic mechanisms
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that satisfy a strong notion of individual rationality, i.e., ex-post individual rationality.
In this paper, we aim to design simple dynamic mechanisms that achieve ex-post individual
rationality and at the same time, approximate the optimal revenue of the full-force dynamic mech-
anism. Toward this goal, we study a family of dynamic mechanisms by applying the idea of bank
accounts, in which single-shot auctions are augmented with a structure we call bank account, a real
number for each node that summarizes the history so far. This structure allows the seller to store
deficits or surpluses of buyer utility from each individual auction and even them out on the long
run. We prove a number of interesting properties for these simple mechanisms.
In this first part of the paper (Section 3), we prove a number of characterization results. These
results ensure that, to maximize revenue in dynamic mechanisms, one only needs to restrict atten-
tion to a subset of bank account mechanisms.
Theorem 3.5 states that for any dynamic mechanism, M , there is a constructive bank account
mechanism (coined core BAM) that: (1) generates the same expected utility as M , (2) generates
weakly higher expected revenue for the auctioneer than M , (3) and is deterministic if M is determin-
istic. Theorem 3.11 provides sufficient and necessary conditions for such construction (Definition
3.9) to be an IC-IR bank account mechanism.
Based on the characterization results, in the second part of the paper (Sections 4-6), we inves-
tigate the problem of how to find the optimal bank account mechanisms.
Theorem 4.5 shows a simple bank account mechanism B that guarantees a constant approxima-
tion to the optimal dynamic mechanism. Then Theorem 5.1 further derandomizes the construction
to get a deterministic bank account mechanism Bd that achieves a constant approximation as well.
We remark that both of B and Bd are constructed based on a given (approximately) optimal (de-
terministic) static mechanism.1 Particularly, for the one item per stage case, the optimal static
mechanism is known and deterministic [Myerson, 1981], and B and Bd are 3− and 5−approximation
of the optimal revenue, respectively. Finally, for the problem of computing optimal mechanisms
when the type space is discrete, we provide an FPTAS2 in Theorem 6.1 via linear and dynamic
programming.
In a parallel work [Mirrokni et al., 2016], we consider the bank account mechanisms under
interim IR constraints. We also prove a characterization result concerning sufficiency of bank
account mechanism in that setting and establish trade-offs between the maximum limit of bank
account balance and revenue.
Ashlagi et al. [Ashlagi et al., 2016] independently study the same problem as ours except that, in
their setting, they assume there is only one item for sale at each stage. They independently propose
a dynamic program to compute the optimal mechanism, in the same spirit as ours in Section
6 but different in implementation details. They also propose a mechanism that 2-approximates
the optimal revenue for the one-item-per-stage setting, in contrast to our 3-approximation in that
specific setting. The approaches used to prove these results, however, are quite different. They
finally extend their dynamic program algorithm to compute the optimal mechanism for the multi-
bidder case and study the case with discounted infinite horizon. We note that our framework can
naturally generalize to the multi-bidder case with one bank account for each of the bidders and we
have performed stationary analysis for the infinite horizon case in our interim IR paper [Mirrokni
et al., 2016].
1The gap between the optimal dynamic mechanism and static mechanism can be arbitrarily large (see Example
4.8).
2Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme.
3
2 Setting
Consider the problem of selling a sequence of items to a buyer who has additive valuations for the
items. At each stage, there can be any number of items for sale, but each item only appears in one
stage. The order in which the items arrive are fixed and commonly known, and the items cannot be
sold in stages after they have arrived. At each stage t ∈ [T ], a type (valuation) vt ∈ Vt = Rkt+ of the
buyer (kt is the number of items for sale at stage t) is privately drawn from a public distribution
Ft, i.e., vt ∼ Ft. We assume that the prior distributions Ft’s are independent stage-wise, while
within each stage, the distribution can be correlated over different items. Moreover, we assume
that all valuations have finite expectations (E[1 · vt] < +∞)3. This assumption is to rule out the
cases where the buyer faces two different strategies that both lead to infinite utilities.
According to the definition above, vt is, in general, a multidimensional vector. None of our
proofs, except the proof of Theorem 6.1, makes use of the assumption that vt is single dimensional.
For the proof of Theorem 6.1, it still extends to the case where vt is multidimensional, by using the
technique from [Cai et al., 2012].
We also remark that all of our results extend to the setting with discounted utilities over time.
The stage outcome at stage t is specified by a pair (xt, pt), where xt ∈ Xt = [0, 1]kt denotes the
allocation vector at stage t and pt ∈ R denotes the stage payment. The buyer utility from this
stage is
ut(·; vt) = xt(·) · vt − pt(·).
The seller’s objective is to design a mechanism that maximizes the total revenue
∑T
τ=1 pt. For
convenience, we use v(τ,τ ′) = vτ , . . . , vτ ′ to denote the vector of buyer’s types from stage τ to τ
′.
Similarly, x(τ,τ ′) = xτ , . . . , xτ ′ , p(τ,τ ′) = pτ , . . . , pτ ′ . We use V(τ,τ ′) = Vτ × · · · × Vτ ′ to denote the
buyer’s type spaces from stage τ to τ ′.
2.1 Dynamic Mechanisms
In this paper, we consider direct mechanisms, where the agent reports its private type to the
mechanism in each stage.
Definition 2.1 (Direct Mechanism). A direct mechanism is a pair of allocation rule and payment
rule. An allocation rule is a mapping xt : V(1,t) → Xt that specifies at any given stage the probability
of allocation of an item to the agent conditioned on the history, i.e., the sequence of types reported
so far. A payment rule pt : V(1,t) → R specifies the payment the agent should make to the auctioneer
at stage t, also conditioned on the sequence of types reported so far.
We are interested in mechanism satisfying two properties: incentive compatibility (IC) and
individual rationality (IR) constraints. In dynamic mechanism design, there are various flavors of
those notions. The flavors we will be interested in this work are as follows. For IC, we will consider
incentive compatible in perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which means that at any given history, truth-
telling is the best response for current and future stages in expectation over the randomness of
future types. For IR, we will be interested in Ex-post individually rationality, which means that
for any type realization, the buyer’s overall utility is non-negative. Notice that this is stronger
than requiring individual rationality in expectation, where the buyer’s utility is non-negative in
expectation over his type.
3We use 1 to denote a vector in which all entries are 1. Similarly for 0.
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To make those notions formal, let a bidding strategy b(t+1,T ) = 〈bt〉(t+1,T ) be a family of (possibly
randomized) maps bt : V(1,t) → Vt specifying which type to report at each stage given the history of
types observed so far. For a fixed bidding strategy b(t+1,T ), let U
b(t+1,T )
t (v(1,t)) be the total utility
that the buyer can obtain in expectation over his type from stages t + 1 to T of the mechanism
given that types v(1,t) were reported in the stages 1 to t and the bidding strategy is employed from
that point on. Formally:
U
b(t+1,T )
t (v(1,t)) = Ev(t+1,T )
[ T∑
τ=t+1
uτ
(
v(1,t), bt+1(v(1,t+1)), . . . , bτ (v(1,τ)); vτ
)]
. (1)
We use Ut without superscript to denote the expected utility yielded by truthful bidding. This
term is often called the promised utility [Li et al., 2013], since it is the utility that the mechanism
promises that the buyer will obtain in expectation if he/she behaves truthfully.
Now we can define IC and IR precisely. We say that the mechanism satisfies IC if at any
given stage his present utility plus expected future utility is maximized by bidding truthfully in the
current and future stages. In other words, for each time t ∈ [T ], every type history v(1,T ) ∈ V(1,T ),
any deviating report at this timestep v′t ∈ Vt and any bidding strategy for the following timesteps
b(t+1,T ), we have:
IC: ut(v(1,t); vt) + Ut(v(1,t)) ≥ ut(v(1,t−1), v′t; vt) + U
b(t+1,T )
t (v(1,t−1), v
′
t); (2)
We say that a mechanism satisfies individual rationality if for every history of types the utility
is non-negative:
IR:
T∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ ) ≥ 0. (3)
It will be convenient to define a simplified notion of IC, called stage-wise IC, which we will show
to be equivalent to the previous notion. We say that a mechanism is stage-wise IC if at any given
stage, reporting truthfully at the current and future steps dominates deviating in the current step
and reporting truthfully from that point on:
Stage-wise IC: ut(v(1,t); vt) + Ut(v(1,t)) ≥ ut(v(1,t−1), v′t; vt) + Ut(v(1,t−1), v′t); (4)
Lemma 2.2. IC (2) is equivalent to stage-wise IC (4).
The advantage to work with stage-wise IC is that we can focus on the current stage and ignore
deviations from this point on. Using backwards induction, we will argue that IC and stage-wise IC
are equivalent.
It is also convenient to define stage-wise IR, which means that at any given stage t, the utility
is non-negative.
Stage-wise IR: ut(v(1,t); vt) ≥ 0. (5)
Lemma 2.3. IR (3) is implied by stage-wise IR (5).
Clearly stage-wise IR implies IR, but not the other way round. What we will show in the next
lemma, however, is that if there is a mechanism that is IC and IR, we can construct a mechanism
that is IC and stage-wise IR with the same allocation rule and the same revenue. The idea is
that if a mechanism is ex-post IR, one can anticipate the payments to earlier stages in such a way
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the buyer is never required to pay more than his actual value. An extreme case of this reduction
is the one where the buyer pays his bid in every round except the last, where the buyer is paid
the difference between all the bids charged during the mechanism and his payment in the original
mechanism.
Lemma 2.4. For any IR direct mechanism M = 〈x(1,T ), p(1,T )〉, there is another direct mechanism
M ′ = 〈x′(1,T ), p′(1,T )〉, such that
1. ∀t ∈ [T ], xt ≡ x′t,
2. ∀v(1,T ) ∈ V(1,T ),
∑T
τ=1 pτ (v(1,τ)) =
∑T
τ=1 p
′
τ (v(1,τ)),
3. M ′ is stage-wise IR,
4. and M ′ is IC, if and only if M is IC.
In light of Lemma 2.2 to 2.4, we can use the stage-wise IC (4) as the equivalent definition of
IC, and assuming that a direct mechanism satisfies stage-wise IR constraint (5) is without loss of
generality.
For any mechanism M , denote the overall expected revenue by Rev(M), overall expected buyer
utility by Utl(M), and overall expected social welfare by Eff(M), i.e.,
Rev(M) = E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
pτ (v(1,τ))
]
,
Utl(M) = U0 = E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ )
]
,
Eff(M) = Utl(M) +Rev(M).
Moreover, define the conditional expected utility with partially realized types v(t,t′),
Utl(M |v(t,t′)) = E
V(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
uτ (V(1,τ);Vτ )
∣∣∣V(t,t′) = v(t,t′)].
A mechanism is deterministic, if for each stage t, xt ∈ {0, 1}kt . A mechanism is history-
independent, if both xt and pt only depend on vt, but not v(1,t−1).
3 Bank account mechanisms
Designing dynamic mechanism is a hard task, mostly because the design space is so large. To
remedy this situation, we propose a class of mechanisms, called bank account mechanisms, that are
simpler and can be shown to contain the revenue optimal mechanism. Moreover, they are based on
a simple principle that is easy to reason about: the mechanism keeps a bank balance for the buyer
and the allocation rule depend on the bank balance and not on the full history of the mechanism.
Bank account mechanisms were introduced in [Mirrokni et al., 2016]. Here we show that this
framework can be used to reduce the problem of designing dynamic mechanisms to the problem
of designing a family of parametrized single-shot mechanism. To understand the spirit of this
reduction, we bring the reader attention to the fact that the stage-wise IC constraint looks very much
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like the IC constraint in single-shot mechanism design for period t, when the quantity pt(v(1,t)) −
Ut(v(1,t)) is used instead of payments. To see that, rewrite the IC constraint (4) as follows:
xt(v(1,t)) · vt −
(
pt(v(1,t))− Ut(v(1,t))
) ≥ xt(v(1,t−1), v′t) · vt − (pt(v(1,t−1), v′t)− Ut(v(1,t−1), v′t)),
which can be considered as the IC condition for some one-shot stage mechanism with allocation
rule xˆt|v(1,t−1)(·) = xt(v(1,t−1), ·) and payment rule pˆt|v(1,t−1)(·) :=
(
pt(v(1,t−1), ·)− Ut(v(1,t−1), ·)
)
.
Furthermore, rewrite the stage payment of a dynamic mechanism as pt(v(1,t)) = pˆt|v(1,t−1)(vt) +
Ut(v(1,t)). This suggests us that the stage payment of any dynamic mechanism can be decom-
posed into the payment pˆt|v(1,t−1)(vt) of some one-shot stage mechanism and a dynamic component
Ut(v(1,t)), i.e., the truthful utility from stages t+ 1 to T .
As a result, it is without loss of generality to think of any dynamic mechanism as a sequence of
per-stage IC mechanisms, described by allocation rule xˆt|v(1,t−1)(·) and payment rule pˆt|v(1,t−1)(·), as
well as an additional per-stage charge Ut(v(1,t)) (a temporary utility deficit), which will eventually
be compensated via future per-stage IC mechanisms.
By the incentive compatibility of the per-stage mechanism, according to the Envelope theorem
[Rochet, 1985], the per-stage allocation rule is the sub-gradient of the per-stage utility,
∂
(
ut(v(1,t); vt) + Ut(v(1,t))
)
∂vt
=
∂
(
xˆt|v(1,t−1)(vt) · vt − pˆt|v(1,t−1)(vt)
)
∂vt
= xt(v(1,t)). (6)
So, given the allocation rule of the per-stage mechanisms, according to our reinterpretation, the
only flexibility of the seller is to design the per-stage charge Ut(v(1,t)), the truthful utility for the
buyer in future stages.
We are now ready to formally define a bank account mechanism (BAM). Imagine that the buyer
has a bank account in his name. In each stage, before the buyer reports his type, the mechanism
moves a certain amount of money from the account to the seller (we call it spend), then the buyer
reveals his type and a single-shot IC mechanism is run. In the end of the mechanism, depending
on the buyer’s reported type, a certain amount of money is deposited in the bank account. The
amount deposited still belongs to the buyer, so it doesn’t correspond to a payment at the current
step. The right way to think about a deposit is an amount of money that the buyer is setting aside
so that the mechanism can spend.
Intuitively, the balance can be regarded as an explicit way to realize per-stage charge Ut —
the change of balance of each stage specifies two things: (i) the amount of utility to compensate
previously promised utilities; and (ii) the amount of newly promised utility starting from this stage.
First we define a generic bank account mechanism and then we discuss which properties it needs
to have to satisfy IC and IR.
Definition 3.1 (Bank Account Mechanism). A bank account mechanism B is a tuple 〈z(1,T ), q(1,T ),
bal(1,T ), d(1,T ), s(1,T )〉, where for each t,
• allocation rule zt : R+ × Vt → Xt, that maps balance and stage type to stage allocation,
• payment rule qt : R+ × Vt → R+, that maps balance and stage type to stage payment,
• balance function balt : V(1,t−1) → R+ is defined recursively by the following equation,
∀vt, balt+1 = balt − st(balt) + dt(balt, vt), (7)
where bal1 = 0. Mathematically, balt is a function of history v(1,t−1). We will often refer to
balt(v(1,t−1)) simply as balt and think of it as a variable that is updated in the course of the
mechanism as the types are revealed.
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Figure 1: Describing dynamic mechanisms with Ut’s (left) incurs a recursive structure over Ut.
Introducing bank account balance (right) helps us to get rid of such recursions, i.e., the deposits dt
and spends st are rather independent with each other.
Buyer
Seller
Bank Account
Step 3. 
Deposit
Step 2. 
Payment
Step 1. 
Spending
Figure 2: Transfer in bank account mechanisms. Revenue comes from both Spending (Step 1) and
Payment (Step 2). In principle, the balance in the bank account belongs to the buyer, but the
seller can spend it according to policy st.
• deposit policy dt : R+ × Vt → R+, that maps balance and stage type to a non-negative real
that is to be added to the current balance,
• spend policy st : R+ → R, that maps balance to a real (no more than balance), that is to be
subtracted from the current balance.
At stage t, a bank account mechanism works as follows, (see Figure 2)
1. The seller spends the balance by st(balt), before learning the buyer’s stage type vt. (st(balt)
directly transfers to the seller’s revenue.)
2. Upon receiving buyer’s report vt, the seller allocates according to zt(balt, vt) to the buyer and
charges qt(balt, vt).
3. The buyer deposits an amount of dt(balt, vt) to the bank account.
It is useful to describe how a bank account mechanism maps to a direct revelation mechanism.
Given a description of a BAM in terms of z(1,T ), q(1,T ), bal(1,T ), d(1,T ), s(1,T ) we map it to the direct
mechanism described by x(1,T ), p(1,R).
For the allocation rule, we define:
xt(v(1,t)) = zt
(
balt(v(1,t−1)), vt
)
.
The payment to the seller is given by:
pt(v(1,t)) = st
(
balt(v(1,t−1))
)
+ qt
(
balt(v(1,t−1)), vt
)
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While the deposit dt(balt, vt) is not present in the description above, it affects the mechanisms in
the sense that it dictates how the balance is updated from one step to the other.
Consider the following example that illustrates the bank account mechanism.
Example 3.2. For the T = 2, one item per stage case. Let the valuation of each item be indepen-
dently identically drawn from the equal revenue distribution, i.e.,
F1 = F2 = F , F(v) =

0, v ≤ 1
1− 1/v, 1 < v < vmax
1, v ≥ vmax
.
The following is a bank account mechanism for this setting.
• Starting with bal1 = 0, spend 0 from the balance, i.e., s1(0) = 0 (Step 1).
• The first item is sold at posted-price 1 (Step 2).
• The buyer deposits money of amount v1− 1 to the bank account, i.e., d1(0, v1) = v1− 1 (Step
3).
• All the balance so far are spent at the beginning of stage 2, i.e., s2(bal2) = bal2 (Step 1).
• The second item is sold at posted-price vmax/ev1−1 (Step 2).
• The buyer deposit nothing at stage 2, i.e., d1(bal2, v2) = 0 (Step 3).
First of all, one can verify that B is IC and IR: it is straightforward to verify that B is IR and
IC for stage 2. For stage 1, (1) reporting v′1 < 1 yields utility 0, since the buyer neither gets the
first item (v′1 is less than the reserve), nor gets the second item (the reserve is higher than vmax);
(2) reporting any v′1 ≥ 1 makes no difference to the buyer than truthfully reporting,
v1 − 1− (v′1 − 1) + E
v2≥r(v′1)
(
v2 − r(v′1)
)
= v1 − v′1 + ln vmax − ln r(v′1)
= v1 − v′1 + ln vmax − ln vmax + ln ev
′
1−1 = v1 − 1.
In fact, it is not hard to show that the bank account mechanism described above is revenue
optimal among all dynamic mechanisms, with optimal revenue 2 + ln ln vmax, while any history
independent mechanism can obtain revenue at most 2.
To sum up, the spend st(balt) in Step 1 can be considered as a prepayment for items to be sold
in stage t. Then, based on the prepayment, the seller provides a per-stage mechanism (allocation
and payment) to the buyer for stage t in Step 2. The prepayment and mechanism are carefully
chosen so as to guarantee stagewise IC. Finally, the buyer deposits part of his/her utility to the
bank account balance in Step 3 to enable prepayments of the future stages.
3.1 Conditions for IC and IR bank account mechanisms
We discuss now sufficient conditions for a bank account mechanism to satisfy IC and IR constraints.
At any given stage t, the type vt reported can affect the agent in two ways: it will influence the
utility he/she gets in the single-shot mechanism defined by zt(balt, ·), q(balt, ·) and it will affect
how much is deposited in his bank account, which will in turn affect how much is spent in future
rounds. If somehow we can design the mechanism such that the agent is indifferent about how
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much we deposit in his/her account and spend from his/her account (i.e., indifferent about the
actual balance he/she has), then we can focus on making the stage mechanism truthful.
Define the utility of the 〈z, q〉-mechanism at stage t as when the type is vt and the reported
type is v′t as:
uˆt(balt, v
′
t; vt) = zt(balt, v
′
t) · vt − qt(balt, v′t). (8)
The expected utility in stage t of the corresponding direct mechanism is:
E
vt
[
ut(v(1,t); vt)
]
= −st(balt) + E
vt
[
uˆt(balt, vt; vt)
]
. (9)
Our next lemma shows that if the previous expression is independent of the bank balance balt, it is
enough for the 〈z, q〉-mechanism to be truthful as a single-shot mechanism for every bank balance
balt.
Lemma 3.3. Bank account mechanism B is IC, if the following two conditions are satisfied,
∀t ∈ [T ], balt, bal′t ≥ 0, vt, v′t ∈ Vt,
uˆt(balt, vt; vt) ≥ uˆt(balt, v′t; vt), (10)
st(balt)− st(bal′t) = Evt
[
uˆt(balt, vt; vt)− uˆt(bal′t, vt; vt)
]
. (11)
Lemma 3.4. Bank account mechanism B is IR, if the following condition is satisfied,
uˆt(balt, vt; vt) ≥ dt(balt, vt). (12)
In the remainder of this paper, we use BAMs to refer to bank account mechanisms satisfying
(10)-(12). Given the previous lemmas, we refer (10) and (11) as IC constraint for BAMs, and (12)
as IR constraint for BAMs.
3.2 It is without loss of generality to focus on Bank Account Mechanisms
The reason why we can focus on bank account mechanisms instead of general dynamic mechanisms
(other than the fact that they are simple) is formally justified by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5. For any direct mechanism M , there is a BAM B, such that,
Rev(B) ≥ Rev(M), Utl(B) = Utl(M).
In addition, if M is deterministic, B is deterministic.
Before conducting the proof of this theorem, we first need to understand that the set of BAMs
is a strict subset of the set of direct mechanisms. In fact, for any BAM that defines the same
balance for two different histories, balt+1(v(1,t)) = balt+1(v
′
(1,t)), the submechanisms after the two
histories must be identical, since balance is the only history related information stored in a BAM.
This is not the case for general direct mechanisms, which may be path-dependent.
Our idea is to conduct a two-step reduction from M to B: firstly, from any direct mechanism
M to a symmetric direct mechanism M ′. We say that a mechanism is symmetric if whenever
conditioned on any two histories at time t, if the expected utility is the same then the allocation
and payment rules are also the same. Formally:
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Definition 3.6 (Symmetric Mechanism). Given any direct mechanism M define the equivalence
relation v(1,t−1) ∼ v′(1,t−1) between histories as:
v(1,t) ∼ v′(1,t) ⇐⇒ Utl(M |v(1,t)) = Utl(M |v′(1,t)). (13)
We say that mechanism M is symmetric, if for any pair of equivalent histories, v(1,t−1) ∼ v′(1,t−1),
the corresponding submechanisms are identical, i.e.,
∀t ≤ t′ ≤ T, v(t,t′) ∈ V(t,t′),
{
xt′(v(1,t−1), v(t,t′)) = xt′(v′(1,t−1), v(t,t′))
pt′(v(1,t−1), v(t,t′)) = pt′(v′(1,t−1), v(t,t′))
.
Our first step is to show that for any mechanism, it is possible to construct a symmetric
mechanism where the utility is the same and the revenue is at least as large:
Lemma 3.7. For any direct mechanism M , there is a symmetric direct mechanism M ′ such that
Utl(M ′) = Utl(M), Rev(M ′) ≥ Rev(M).
In particular, if M is deterministic, M ′ is also deterministic.
The second step in the reduction is to show that any symmetric direct mechanism can be
converted to a BAM.
Lemma 3.8. For any symmetric direct mechanism M ′, there is a Core BAM B such that
Utl(B) = Utl(M ′), Rev(B) = Rev(M ′).
In fact, we will show that any mechanism can be converted to a specific type of BAM, which we
will denote Core BAM. The rest of this section is devoted to proving the previous lemmas, which
taken together constitute a proof of Theorem 3.5. We will start by defining the concept of Core
BAM which will be central to our analysis.
Let H = H0∪H1∪· · ·∪HT be the set of all histories, where Ht = V(1,t) is the set of all histories
of length t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ). In particular, H0 = {∅}.
For any 0 ≤ t ≤ T , Let gt be a function that maps a history of length t to a real number, and
yt (for t ≥ 1) be a function that maps a history of length t to a stage allocation.
gt : Ht → R, ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T ;
yt : Ht → Xt, ∀t ∈ [T ].
Intuitively, we will construct a BAM, called core BAM, that yields the same conditional utility
as g and the same allocation as y, where g and y denote g0, . . . , gT and y1, . . . , yT , respectively.
Definition 3.9 (Core BAM). Consider the following construction of bank account mechanism based
on g and y, denoted as Bg,y.
balt+1(v(1,t)) = gt(v(1,t))− µt, (14)
zt
(
balt(v(1,t−1)), vt
)
= yt(v(1,t)), (15)
qt(balt, vt) = zt(balt, vt) · vt −
∫ vt
0
zt(balt, v)dv, (16)
dt(balt, vt) = uˆt(balt, vt; vt), (17)
st(balt) = balt + dt(balt, vt)− balt+1, (18)
where for t < T , µt = infv(1,t) gt(v(1,t)); µT = min
{
0, infv(1,T ) gT (v(1,T ))
}
.
When the construction above is a valid BAM, we call it a core BAM.
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For the construction in Definition 3.9 to be valid BAM we need certain conditions to be satisfied.
For equation (15) to be well-defined, we need that yt(v(1,t)) = yt(v
′
(1,t−1), vt) whenever gt(v(1,t−1)) =
gt(v
′
(1,t−1)), otherwise equation (15) would imply different values of zt for the same bank balance.
Also for IC constraint (10) to be satisfied, we need the allocation function yt(v(1,t)) to be weakly
increasing in vt. In Theorem 3.11 we will provide necessary and sufficient conditions on gt and yt
for the mechanism to be a valid core BAM.
We also want to remind that reader that our theorems hold in the case where more than one
item is auctioned in each stage. In the first time the reader reads our theorems, we recommend
him to focus on the single-item per round case and interpret the integrals as one-variable integrals.
However, they hold in general multi-dimensional case as well, by interpreting the integration in
(16) as a multidimensional path-integral 0 to vt. If zt(balt, v) is the sub-gradient of some multi-
dimensional valued input, then the value of the integral is independent of the integration path. As
we will see in Theorem 3.11, a necessary condition for the mechanism Bg,y to be a Core BAM is
that yt is the sub-gradient of gt.
Core BAM is a key construction throughout this paper because it is without loss of generality
to restrict to Core BAMs, as we will prove that Theorem 3.5 is still true even if we replace BAM
by Core BAM in the statement of the theorem.
Now we are ready to prove the lemmas. Both of the proofs are constructive. The idea to prove
Lemma 3.7 is sketched as follows:
1. Given a direct mechanism M , we construct equivalence classes defined by (13).
2. For each equivalence class, select a representative history v∗(1,t−1) such that the revenue from
the submechanism at this history dominates the expected revenue from the submechanisms
at the histories in this equivalence class.
3. At history v(1,t−1) and stage type vt, M ′ simulates what M does at history v∗(1,t−1) with stage
type vt.
4. However, applying such simulation to histories at stage t will destroy the equivalence relation
in stage t+ 1 since it changes the utilities in stage t+ 1.
5. Our idea is to replace each history with its representative history inductively, stage by stage
(so that when the replacement procedure is applied up to stage t, then equivalence relation
in stage t+ 1 is determined).
6. The so-constructed mechanism is symmetric and we verify that it satisfies the desirable prop-
erties.
The representative history in an equivalent class is a history in this class such that the seller’s
revenue at this history is no less than the expected revenue in this equivalence class. Clearly, such
a history always exists. Intuitively, by replacing all histories in an equivalent class with such a
representative history, one can ensure that the seller’s expected revenue weakly increases while the
buyer’s utility remains the same.
Instead of directly proving Lemma 3.8, we prove the following stronger version: for each sym-
metric direct mechanism, one can construct a Core BAM with the same overall outcome.
Lemma 3.10. For any symmetric direct mechanism M , Bg,y is a BAM, if
∀0 ≤ t ≤ T, ht ∈ Ht, gt(ht) = Utl(M |ht), ∀t ∈ [T ], ht ∈ Ht, yt(ht) = xt(ht). (19)
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Figure 3: The intersection of OPTs and Core BAMs is non-empty.
Moreover, Bg,y has the same overall allocation and payment, as a result,
Utl(Bg,y) = Utl(M) = g0(∅), Rev(Bg,y) = Rev(M).
Then the proof of this lemma is to verify that so-constructed Bg,y is indeed a BAM.
In light of Theorem 3.5, it is without loss of generality to consider core BAMs only for the pur-
pose of this paper. Most of our results (approximation and computation) rely on the construction
of core BAMs. However, as mentioned, the construction Bg,y is not guaranteed to be a core BAM
for an arbitrary pair of g and y. At the end of this section, we characterize the set of pairs of g and
y such that Bg,y is a Core BAM (Theorem 3.11). The characterization will be used to construct
feasibility constraints for finding the optimal Core BAMs in Section 6.
Theorem 3.11. Bg,y is a core BAM, if and only if for any t ∈ [T ],
• yt is the sub-gradient of gt with respect to vt with range being Xt, i.e., yt(v(1,t)) = ∂gt(v(1,t))/∂vt
and yt(v(1,t)) ∈ Xt.
• gt is consistent, symmetric, convex in vt and weakly increasing in vt.
Consistency and symmetry are defined as follows,
∀t ∈ [T ], v(1,t), v′(1,t) ∈ V(1,t)
consistent: gt−1(v(1,t−1))− E
vt
[
gt(v(1,t))
]
= ct,
symmetric: gt−1(v(1,t−1)) = gt−1(v′(1,t−1)) =⇒ gt(v(1,t)) = gt(v′(1,t−1), vt),
where ct is a constant.
As a result, it is without loss of generality to study BAMs and Core BAMs in the rest of the
paper.
Figure 3 visualizes our findings so far. For more details and intuitions behind, we refer the
readers to Appendix (along with the proof of Theorem 3.11).
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4 Approximation of Optimal Mechanism
By Theorem 3.5, the revenue optimal bank account mechanism is optimal among any mechanism.
However, the optimal bank account mechanism can still be complicated. This observation is for-
malized in a later section. Later in this section, we will use an example to informally illustrate this
observation.
4.1 A simple BAM that 3-Approximates the optimal revenue
In this section we present a very simple BAM whose revenue is a 3-approximation of the revenue
of the revenue optimal mechanism. By Theorem 3.5 we know that the optimal revenue is achieved
by a BAM, so our strategy will be to first provide an upper bound on the maximum revenue that
a BAM mechanism can extract. Then we will craft three individual mechanisms achieving one of
the components of the upper bound as revenue. Then we will argue that their combination is a
constant approximation to the optimal revenue.
We begin with an upper bound on the revenue of a BAM. The following theorem is a version
of Theorem 3 in our previous paper where bank accounts were introduced [Mirrokni et al., 2016].
Theorem 4.1. For any BAM B,
Rev(B) ≤ Rev(MS) + E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sτ (balτ )
]
.
where MS denotes the optimal history-independent mechanism, i.e., within each stage, run the
single-stage optimal mechanism.
There is a simple mechanism that achieves the first part of the upper bound, which is the
optimal history-independent mechanism itself. In the case where a single item is sold per stage,
this is achieved by running Myerson’s optimal auction in each stage. The main challenge is to come
up with a mechanism whose revenue approximates the sum of spends of any BAM.
We start by providing an bound on the the sum of spends
∑T
τ=1 sτ (balτ ) for any history v(1,T ).
Denote
Valt =
∫
Vt
1 · vdF(v),
then
Lemma 4.2. For any BAM, the spend and deposit in any stage can be bounded as follows:
st(balt) ≤ min{balt,Valt},
dt(balt, vt) ≤ 1 · vt.
Lemma 4.3. For any BAM B, and any history v(1,t) ∈ V(1,t) of length t ∈ [T ]. The sum of spends
of B on history v(1,t) can be bounded as follows,
t∑
τ=1
sτ (balτ ) ≤
t∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ),
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where s∗τ and d∗τ are the spend and deposit policies of a bank account mechanism B∗, defined as
follows,
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ) = min{bal∗τ ,Valτ},
d∗τ (bal
∗
τ , vτ ) = 1 · vτ ,
and bal∗τ is the balance of B∗ updated accordingly.
The intuition behind Lemma 4.3 is: (i) for any fixed history v(1,t), increasing any stage deposit
dτ into the bank account never disables the seller to spend from the bank account at any stage
as before, so we can set each of the stage deposit dτ to reach its upper bound 1 · vτ ; (ii) after
increasing the stage deposits, they become a sequence of constant incoming flows to the bank
account, so taking money out from the bank account as much as possible at each stage is clearly
the optimal way to maximize the cumulative spends until any stage.
The takeaway from Lemma 4.3 is that in order to maximize the sum of spends, we should try
to keep the balance as large as possible by depositing as much as possible and at the same time we
should try to spend as much as possible. Instead of trying to find a BAM with those two properties
simultaneously, we define two mechanisms: the first one has the largest possible deposit in each
stage. This is called the give-for-free mechanism where all items are given to the buyer for free
at every stage. Here the utility of the buyer is maximized and all the utility is deposited in the
bank account. The second mechanism seeks to spend as much as possible from the balance in each
round. This is called posted-price-for-the-grand-bundle mechanism. This mechanism will post a
price for the grand-bundle ensuring that the buyer will have enough utility in expectation so that
he is comfortable with a large spend from his/her bank account.
Then, by the approach stated earlier, the uniform randomization of these three mechanisms
(optimal history-independent mechanism, give-for-free mechanism, and posted-price-for-the-grand-
bundle mechanism) 3-approximates the optimal revenue.
To formalize our reasoning so far, let MS = 〈xS(1,T ), pS(1,T )〉 denote the optimal history indepen-
dent mechanism, i.e., within each stage, separately run the single-stage optimal mechanism4.
Let 〈xPt (θ, ·), pPt (θ, ·)〉 be the posted-price-for-the-grand-bundle mechanism with parameter θ for
stage t, i.e.,
xPt (θ, vt) = 1 · I[vt · 1 ≥ rt(θ)], pPt (θ, vt) = rt(θ) · I[vt · 1 ≥ rt(θ)], (20)
where rt(θ) is the posted-price such that the expected buyer utility yielded by the single-stage
posted-price-for-the-grand-bundle mechanism is exactly θ, formally,
rt(θ) = r, s.t.,
∫
Vt
(v · 1− r) · I[v · 1 ≥ r]dv = θ,=⇒ E
vt
[
uPt (θ, vt; vt)
]
= θ. (21)
Since the function
∫
Vt(v ·1− r) · I[v ·1 ≥ r]dv is continuous in θ, a price rt(θ) exists for every θ
in the interval [0,Valt]. Note that the integration above is the expected utility when the items are
sold as a grand bundle at posted-price r in stage t.
4If there is only one item for sale for each stage, then MS denotes the mechanism that runs separate Myerson
auction for each stage.
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Mechanism 1 (3-Approximation BAM). Consider the following BAM, B — the uniform ran-
domization of the optimal history-independent mechanism MS, the posted-price-for-the-grand-
bundle mechanism (with parameter 3st(balt) for each stage t), and the give-for-free mechanism.
Formally defined as follows, where balt is defined by dt and st according to the balance update
formula (7).
zt(balt, vt) =
1
3
(
xSt (vt) + 1 + x
P
t
(
3st(balt), vt
))
, (22)
qt(balt, vt) =
1
3
(
pSt (vt) + p
P
t
(
3st(balt), vt
))
, (23)
dt(balt, vt) =
1 · vt
3
, (24)
st(balt) = min{balt,Valt/3}, (25)
where Valt =
∫
Vt 1 · vdFt(v).
Such a uniform randomization ensures that for any core BAM B′, the following properties hold
simultaneously.
• The one third fraction on the optimal history-independent mechanism ensures enough revenue
from per stage payment qt:
∀t ∈ [T ], balt, bal′t ≥ 0, vt ∈ Vt, qt(balt, vt) ≥
1
3
q′t(bal
′
t, vt).
• The one third fraction on the posted-price-for-the-grand-bundle mechanism with parameter5
3st(balt) ensures enough spend st from the bank account in each stage:
∀t ∈ [T ], balt ≥ 0, st(balt) ≥ 1
3
s′t(balt).
• The one third fraction on the give-for-free mechanism ensures enough deposit dt into the bank
account in each stage:
∀t ∈ [T ], balt, bal′t ≥ 0, vt ∈ Vt, dt(balt, vt) ≥
1
3
d′t(bal
′
t, vt).
Lemma 4.4. Mechanism 1 is a BAM.
Theorem 4.5. Mechanism 1 3-approximates the optimal revenue.
In particular, if MS is given, then such BAM can be explicitly constructed.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. By Theorem 4.1, we have,
Rev(BOPT) ≤ Rev(MS) + E
(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sOPTτ (bal
OPT
τ )
]
. (26)
5Since it is only one third fraction on the posted-price-for-the-grand-bundle mechanism, having parameter 3st(balt)
ensures the buyer utility yielded from this one third fraction being exactly st(balt).
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By Lemma 4.3, we have,
T∑
τ=1
sOPTτ (bal
OPT
τ ) ≤
T∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ). (27)
By the definition of B (see (24) and (25)), we have that balt = bal
∗
t /3, dt = d
∗
t /3 and st = s
∗
t /3.
Hence by the definition of B (see (23)),
Rev(B) = E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
(
qτ (balτ , vτ ) + sτ (balτ )
)]
≥ 1
3
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
pSτ (vτ )
]
+
1
3
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sτ (balτ )
)]
=
1
3
(
Rev(MS) + E
(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ )
])
. (28)
Combining (26)(27)(28) above, we complete the proof,
Rev(B) ≥ 1
3
(
Rev(MS) + E
(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ )
])
≥ 1
3
(
Rev(MS) + E
(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sOPTτ (bal
OPT
τ )
])
≥ 1
3
Rev(BOPT).
In particular, for the case where only one item is sold in each stage, the optimal history-
independent mechanism is the separate Myerson auction for each stage. So we can explicitly
construct Mechanism 1 in this case.
Also note that, the optimal history-independent mechanism is unknown for general cases. How-
ever, there have been many recent results concerning approximately optimal mechanism for certain
valuation assumptions [Hart and Nisan, 2012, Li and Yao, 2013, Babaioff et al., 2014, Cai et al.,
2016]. The following corollary allows us to transform these approximately optimal mechanisms into
an approximately optimal mechanism in our setting.
Corollary 4.6. If there is a history-independent mechanism M approximates MS, i.e., Rev(M)
≥ αRev(MS), one can explicitly construct a BAM B that approximates the optimal dynamic mech-
anism BOPT, i.e.,
Rev(B) ≥ α
2α+ 1
Rev(BOPT).
B is a randomization of M , the give-for-free mechanism, and the posted-price-for-the-grand-bundle
with rt
(
(2+1/α)st(balt)
)
for each t, on weights 1/(2α+1), α/(2α+1), and α/(2α+1), respectively.
4.2 Global connectivity is necessary to achieve any constant approximations
We show by example that the bank account structure (or some other structure that summarizes
the entire history) is necessary to achieve a constant approximation as the complementary to the
3-approximation results.
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A local mechanism is a submechanism that only involves a subset of stages regardless of the
valuation distribution, and is completely independent with what happens in other stages. For
example, the stage mechanisms of a history-independent mechanism are local mechanisms, which
operates independently with each other.
Observation 4.7. Any dynamic mechanism that can be decomposed into several independent local
mechanisms cannot be optimal — in fact, it cannot guarantee any constant approximation.
In particular, it is also true for the mechanisms that are distributions over such mechanisms.
The observation above informally states the fact that a global structure such as the “bank
account” introduced in this paper is essential to preserve the optimal revenue.
Example 4.8 (Necessity of global connectivity). Consider a dynamic mechanism M that can be
decomposed into two independent local mechanisms, i.e., there exists T ′, 1 < T ′ < T , such that the
outcomes of stages T ′ + 1 to T are independent with what has happened in the first T ′ stages.
We construct the following valuation distributions,
• the first and the (T ′ + 1)-th items are i.i.d. equal-revenue distributions (see Example 3.2);
• all other items have 0 valuations.
By our assumption, M treats the two items with equal-revenue valuations independently, and
can extract revenue at most 1 from each such stage without violating the ex-post IR constraint.
(Because all other zero-valued items can be ignored.)
However, for example 3.2, we have shown a BAM with revenue 2 + ln ln vmax  2 (as vmax
tends to infinity) on a similar instance. To adjust the mechanism introduced in Example 3.2 to this
example, let B be a BAM as follows,
bal1 = 0, z1(bal1, v1) = 1, q1(bal1, v1) = 1, d1(bal1, v1) = v1 − 1, s1(bal1) = 0;
zT ′+1(balT ′+1, vT ′+1) = I[vT ′+1 ≥ vmax/ebalT ′+1 ],
qT ′+1(balT ′+1, vT ′+1) = zT ′+1(balT ′+1, vT ′+1) · vmax/ebalT ′+1 ,
dT ′+1(balT ′+1, vT ′+1) = 0, sT ′+1(balT ′+1) = min{ln vmax, balT ′+1};
∀t 6= 1, T ′ + 1, zt(balt, vt) = 0, qt(balt, vt) = 0, dt(balt, vt) = 0, st(balt) = 0.
=⇒Rev(B) = E
v1,vT ′+1
[q1(v1) + qT ′+1(v(1,T ′+1)) + s1(bal1) + sT ′+1(balT ′+1)]
= 2 + E
v1
[
min{v1 − 1, ln vmax}
]
= 2 + ln ln vmax.
In other words, the gap between BAM (hence the optimal mechanism) and independent local
mechanisms can be arbitrarily far on such instances.
5 Constant approximation via deterministic BAM
In this section, we prove the existence of deterministic BAM that guarantees constant approxima-
tion of the optimal revenue.
However, since there is an arbitrarily large gap between deterministic and optimal mechanisms
for non-dynamic multidimensional case (even for 2-item, 1-buyer case [Hart and Nisan, 2013]),
there is no general approximation guarantee of deterministic mechanisms. Instead, we prove that if
there is a reasonably good (constant) approximation of the optimal history-independent mechanism,
there is also a constant approximation of the optimal dynamic mechanism.
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Theorem 5.1. If there is a deterministic (history-independent) mechanism M that is a constant
approximation of the optimal history-independent mechanism MS, i.e., Rev(M) ≥ αRev(MS),
then one can construct a deterministic BAM B based on M , such that B is a constant approximation
to the revenue of the optimal (possibly randomized) dynamic mechanism BOPT, i.e.,
Rev(B) ≥ α
4α+ 1
Rev(BOPT). (29)
In particular, for the one item per stage case, α = 1 (since in this case, MS is just a posted-price
mechanism), and B guarantees a 5-approximation.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. First of all, if Rev(MS) ≥ Rev(BOPT)/(4α+ 1), then M is a good approx-
imation, Rev(M) ≥ αRev(MS) ≥ αRev(BOPT)/(4α+ 1).
Otherwise, suppose Rev(MS) < Rev(BOPT)/(4α+ 1), then by Theorem 4.1,
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sOPTτ (bal
OPT
τ )
]
≥ 4α
4α+ 1
Rev(BOPT). (30)
Then we prove that there is a deterministic BAM B that approximates the expected overall spend
of BOPT, i.e.,
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sτ (balτ )
]
≥ 1
4
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sOPTτ (bal
OPT
τ )
]
(31)
Recall that the randomization over the give-for-free mechanism and the posted-price-for-the-
grand-bundle mechanism (each with probability 1/3) guarantees a 3-approximation to Ev(1,T )
[∑T
τ=1 s
∗
τ (bal
∗
τ )
]
, (see inequality (28)).
Similarly the following construction of B†, a uniform randomization of the give-for-free mech-
anism and the posted-price-for-the-grand-bundle mechanism (with posted-price at r†t for each t),
always spends half of the maximum of overall spend.
z†t (bal
†
t , vt) =
1
2
(
1 + xPt
(
2s†t(bal
†
t), vt
))
, q†t (bal
†
t , vt) =
1
2
pPt
(
2s†t(bal
†
t), vt
)
,
d†t(bal
†
t , vt) =
1 · vt
2
, s†t(bal
†
t) = min{bal†t ,Valt/2},
=⇒∀v(1,T ) ∈ V(1,T ),
T∑
τ=1
s†τ (bal
†
τ ) =
1
2
T∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ). (32)
Combining (27), B† also guarantees a 2-approximation to the expected overall spend of the
BOPT.
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
s†τ (bal
†
τ )
]
=
1
2
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ )
]
≥ 1
2
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sOPTτ (bal
OPT
τ )
]
. (33)
Unfortunately, B† is not deterministic, since it is a mixture of two deterministic mechanism,
i.e., z†t (bal
†
t , vt) ∈ {1/2, 1}. Then the rest of the proof focuses on the derandomization of B† to get
a deterministic BAM that guarantees a constant approximation to the expected overall spend of
B†.
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Consider BAM6 Bσ defined by a binary string σ ∈ {0, 1}T as follows,
if σt = 0 : z
σ
t (bal
σ
t , vt) = 1, q
σ
t (bal
σ
t , vt) = 0, d
σ
t (bal
σ
t , vt) = 1 · vt, sσt (balσt ) = 0;
if σt = 1 : z
σ
t (bal
σ
t , vt) = x
P
t
(
sσt (bal
σ
t ), vt
)
, qσt (bal
σ
t , vt) = p
P
t
(
sσt (bal
σ
t ), vt
)
,
dσt (bal
σ
t , vt) = 0, s
σ
t (bal
σ
t ) = min{balσt ,Valt}.
Intuitively, if σt = 0, then B
σ runs the give-for-free mechanism and deposits to the balance;
if σt = 1, then B
σ spends the balance and runs the posted-price-for-the-grand-bundle mechanism
with parameter equal to the spend sσt (bal
σ
t ).
We then argue that for binary string σ chosen at uniformly random, Eσ[Rev(B
σ)] ≥ Ω(Rev(BOPT)).
Thus at least one out of them guarantees a constant approximation to the optimal revenue.
Consider the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2.
∀t ∈ [T ], v(1,T ) ∈ V(1,T ), E
σ
[
sσt (bal
σ
t )
]
≥ 1
4
s∗t (bal
∗
t ). (34)
Hence
E
σ
[
Rev(Bσ)
]
= E
σ,v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
(
qστ (bal
σ
τ , vτ ) + s
σ
τ (bal
σ
τ )
)]
≥ E
σ,v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sστ (bal
σ
τ )
]
≥ 1
4
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ )
]
≥ 1
4
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sOPTτ (bal
OPT
τ )
]
,
where the last inequality is from (27).
Therefore there exists one σ∗ ∈ {0, 1}T , such that
Rev(Bσ
∗
) ≥ E
σ
[
Rev(Bσ)
] ≥ 1
4
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sOPTτ (bal
OPT
τ )
]
,
and by assumption (30), we conclude that
Rev(Bσ
∗
) ≥ 1
4
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sOPTτ (bal
OPT
τ )
]
≥ α
4α+ 1
Rev(BOPT).
Note that for any σ, Bσ is a deterministic BAM by construction. So in summary, at least one
out of these 2T + 1 deterministic mechanisms, {M} ∪ {Bσ|σ ∈ {0, 1}T}, guarantees the desired
constant approximation to the optimal revenue.
6 Computing Optimal Bank Account Mechanism via Dynamic
Programming
In this section, we put forward a dynamic programing algorithm and FPTAS to compute the
optimal mechanism for the discrete type case. We show a proof for the one item per stage case (see
Appendix A.13), and argue that it can be directly generalized to the multi-item per stage case by
using the method from [Cai et al., 2012].
6We omit the proof that Bσ is a BAM, since it is almost the same with proving Mechanism 1 is a BAM in the
proof of Theorem 4.5.
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Theorem 6.1. The optimal bank account mechanism can be computed through a dynamic program-
ming algorithm.
Moreover, for any  > 0, there is an FPTAS to achieve an -approximation (multiplicative) of
the optimal revenue for the one item per stage case with discrete valuation distributions for each
stage.
Corollary 6.2. For any  > 0, there is an FPTAS to achieve an -approximation (multiplicative) of
the optimal revenue for the general (multi-item per stage) case with discrete valuation distributions.
Proof sketch of Theorem 6.1. We outline the proof idea here and leave the complete proof to Ap-
pendix A.13.
By Theorem 3.5, we assume that the optimal mechanism is a core BAM Bg,y. By Theorem 3.11
and Lemma 3.10, it is without loss of generality to assume that gt(ht) = Utl(B|ht). Since yt is the
sub-gradient of gt and gt is symmetric, we denote zt(balt, vt) as yt
(
gt(v(1,t−1)), vt
)
, by overloading
the definition of yt.
We claim that the optimal mechanism can be computed via a dynamic program with state
function φt(ξ), which is the optimal revenue for the sub-problem (consists of stages t+ 1 to T ) but
with additional constraint that the promised utility must equal to ξ (Ut = ξ).
Formally,
φt(ξ) = max
B:gt(v(1,t))=ξ
E
v(t+1,T )
[ T∑
τ=t+1
yt
(
gt(v(1,τ−1)), vτ
) · vτ − balT+1].
It can be computed from φt+1(ξ) by the following program.
maximize E
vt
[
yt(ξ, vt) · vt + φt+1
(
g(ξ, vt)
)]
(35)
subject to uˆt(ξ, vt; vt) ≥ uˆt(ξ, v′t; vt), ∀vt ∈ Vt
g(ξ, vt) = ξ + uˆt(ξ, vt; vt)− E
v′t
[
uˆt(ξ, v
′
t; v
′
t)
] ≥ 0, ∀vt ∈ Vt
Then maxξ≥0 φ0(ξ) = maxB Rev(B) is the optimal revenue, and function φ0(ξ) can be computed
via dynamic program starting from φT (ξ) = −ξ. For any t, φt(ξ) is a concave function, and once
the optimal revenue is determined, we can recover the entire mechanism by solving program (35)
for each stage.
For discrete type space cases, program (35) can be written as an LP that can be efficiently
solved by techniques introduced in [Cai et al., 2012]. Moreover, since φt(ξ) is concave, it can be
bounded by two concave piece-wise linear functions within any constant δ > 0. Since the number
of pieces of the bounds is at most O(N/δ)7, this dynamic algorithm admits an FPTAS.
We conjecture that the computation of the exact solution is likely to be hard, because in general
cases, the description of the BAM could be exponentially large (since there could be exponentially
many different values of balance).
In addition, if one wants to further generalize the results for continuous valuation distributions
by discretization of the valuation domain, one needs to relax the IC and IR constraints to -IC and
-IR, which may be an interesting future direction.
7N is the input size
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APPENDIX
A Omitted proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof of Lemma 2.2. IC =⇒ stage-wise IC:
Let b(t+1,T ) be the truthful bidding strategy from stage t+ 1, we immediately have IC (2) =⇒
stage-wise IC (4).
IC ⇐= stage-wise IC:
Let bt(v(1,t)) = v
′
t be some bidding strategy, and take expectation on the stage-wise IC constraint
(4) over vt, we have
E
vt
[
ut(v(1,t); vt) + Ut(v(1,t))
] ≥ E
vt
[
ut
(
v(1,t−1), bt(v(1,t)); vt
)
+ Ut
(
v(1,t−1), bt(v(1,t))
)]
,
In other words,
Ut−1(v(1,t−1)) ≥ U btt−1(v(1,t−1)).
Combining (4):
ut(v(1,t); vt) + Ut(v(1,t)) ≥ ut(v(1,t−1), v′t; vt) + Ut(v(1,t−1), v′t)
we have
ut(v(1,t); vt) + Ut(v(1,t)) ≥ ut(v(1,t−1), v′t; vt) + U bt+1t (v(1,t−1), v′t).
Take expectation on the last inequality above over vt, we have
Ut−1(v(1,t−1)) ≥ U b(t,t+1)t−1 (v(1,t−1))
Repeat the same argument above, we have
ut(v(1,t); vt) + Ut(v(1,t)) ≥ ut(v(1,t−1), v′t; vt) + U
b(t+1,t+2)
t (v(1,t−1), v
′
t) =⇒ · · · =⇒ (2).
This proves the equivalence between IC and stage-wise IC.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof of Lemma 2.3. To show that stage-wise IR implies IR, sum up the stage-wise IR constraints
(5) from stage 1 to T , we directly have the IR constraint (3).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.4
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Recall the construction of M ′ is as follows,
•
∀t ∈ [T ], v(1,t) ∈ V(1,t), x′t(v(1,t)) = xt(v(1,t));
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•∀t < T, v(1,t) ∈ V(1,t), p′t(v(1,t)) = x′t(v(1,t)) · vt;
∀v(1,T ) ∈ V(1,T ), p′T (v(1,T )) =
T∑
τ=1
pτ (v(1,τ))−
T−1∑
τ=1
p′τ (v(1,τ)).
We prove that the required properties in Lemma 2.4 are met.
Properties 1 and 2 are straightforward from the construction.
Property 3. For first T − 1 stages,
u′t(v(1,t); vt) = x
′
t(v(1,t)) · vt − p′t(v(1,t)) = 0 =⇒ (5);
for the last stage,
u′T (v(1,T ); vT ) = x
′
t(v(1,t)) · vt − p′t(v(1,t))
= x′t(v(1,t)) · vt −
( T∑
τ=1
pτ (v(1,τ))−
T−1∑
τ=1
p′τ (v(1,τ))
)
=
T∑
τ=1
x′τ (v(1,τ)) · vτ −
T∑
τ=1
pτ (v(1,τ))
=
T∑
τ=1
xτ (v(1,τ)) · vτ −
T∑
τ=1
pτ (v(1,τ))
=
T∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ )
≥ 0 =⇒ (5),
where the last inequality is from the IR condition (3) of M .
Property 4 is also straightforward. Firstly, rewrite the IC condition as follows by including all
the utilities from past stages,
t∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ ) + Ut(v(1,t)) ≥
t−1∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ ) + ut(v(1,t−1), v′t; vt) + U
b(t+1,T )
t (v(1,t−1), v
′
t).
Then by properties 1 and 2, the left-hand-side for M and M ′ are the same, and similar with the
right-hand-side.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.3 & 3.4
Throughout the proof of Lemma 3.3 and 3.4, we use the following notations,
balτ = balτ (v(1,τ−1)), bal(t)τ = balτ (v(1,t−1), v
′
t, v(t+1,τ)), sτ = sτ (balτ ), s
(t)
τ = sτ (bal
(t)
τ ),
where the superscript (t) means the valuation of stage t is replaced by some v′t.
We also enhance both lemmas by generalizing the conclusions to a border set of direct mecha-
nisms (beyond the direct mechanism we map the bank account mechanism B to).
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For any given bank account mechanism B, let M be any direct mechanism that has the same
allocation rule and generates the same revenue with B. Formally,
∀t ∈ [T ], v(1,T ) ∈ V(1,T ),

xt(v(1,t)) = zt(balt, vt)
T∑
τ=1
pτ (v(1,τ)) =
T∑
τ=1
(
qτ (balτ , vτ ) + sτ (balτ )
) (36)
=⇒
T∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ ) =
T∑
τ=1
(
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ )− sτ (balτ )
)
. (37)
Then Lemma 3.3 and 3.4 work for M accordingly.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. For any v(1,t), consider the following,
t−1∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ ) + ut(v(1,t−1), v′t; vt) + Ut(v(1,t−1), v
′
t)
=
t−1∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ ) + ut(v(1,t−1), v′t; vt) + Ev(t+1,T )
[ T∑
τ=t+1
uτ (v(1,t−1), v′t, v(t+1,τ); vτ )
]
= E
v(t+1,T )
[ t−1∑
τ=1
(
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ )− sτ
)
+ uˆt(balt, v
′
t; vt)− st +
T∑
τ=t+1
(
uˆτ (bal
(t)
τ , vτ ; vτ )− s(t)τ
)]
,
where the last equation comes from replacing
∑T
τ=1 uτ according to (37).
Hence,
ut(v(1,t); vt) + Ut(v(1,t))−
(
ut(v(1,t−1), v′t; vt) + Ut(v(1,t−1), v
′
t)
)
=
t−1∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ ) + ut(v(1,t); vt) + Ut(v(1,t))−
( t−1∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ ) + ut(v(1,t−1), v′t; vt) + Ut(v(1,t−1), v
′
t)
)
= E
v(t+1,T )
[ t−1∑
τ=1
(
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ )− sτ
)
+ uˆt(balt, vt; vt)− st +
T∑
τ=t+1
(
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ )− sτ
)]
− E
v(t+1,T )
[ t−1∑
τ=1
(
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ )− sτ
)
+ uˆt(balt, v
′
t; vt)− st +
T∑
τ=t+1
(
uˆτ (bal
(t)
τ , vτ ; vτ )− s(t)τ
)]
= E
v(t+1,T )
[
uˆt(balt, vt; vt)− uˆt(balt, v′t; vt) +
T∑
τ=t+1
(
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ )− uˆτ (bal(t)τ , vτ ; vτ )− sτ + s(t)τ
)]
=
T∑
τ=t+1
E
v(t+1,τ−1)
[
E
vτ
[
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ )− uˆτ (bal(t)τ , vτ ; vτ )
]
− sτ + s(t)τ
]
+ uˆt(balt, vt; vt)− uˆt(balt, v′t; vt).
Note that by (11),
E
vτ
[
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ )− uˆτ (bal(t)τ , vτ ; vτ )
]
− sτ + s(t)τ = 0,
and by (10),
uˆt(balt, vt; vt)− uˆt(balt, v′t; vt) ≥ 0.
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Therefore we have
ut(v(1,t); vt) + Ut(v(1,t))−
(
ut(v(1,t−1), v′t; vt) + Ut(v(1,t−1), v
′
t)
)
≥ 0,
which is exactly the IC constraint (4) for M , namely, (10)(11) =⇒ (4).
Proof of Lemma 3.4. From the balance update formula (7), we have
T∑
τ=1
dτ (balτ , vτ ) =
T∑
τ=1
(
balτ+1 − balτ + sτ (balτ )
)
= balT+1 − bal1 +
T∑
τ=1
sτ (balτ ).
Then sum up (12) from 1 to T ,
T∑
τ=1
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ ) ≥
T∑
τ=1
dτ (balτ , vτ ) = balT+1 − bal1 +
T∑
τ=1
sτ (balτ ) ≥
T∑
τ=1
sτ (balτ ),
where the last inequality is from the fact that bal1 = 0 (by definition), and balT+1 ≥ 0 (dt is
non-negative, and st is no more than balt). Then by (37),
∀v(1,T ) ∈ V(1,T ),
T∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ ) =
T∑
τ=1
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ )−
T∑
τ=1
sτ (balτ ) ≥ 0 =⇒ (3).
Thus M is IR. In other words, (12) =⇒ (3).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3.7
Proof of Lemma 3.7. Without loss of generality8, suppose that
∀t < T, v(1,t) ∈ V(1,t), ut(v(1,t); vt) = 0. (38)
Consider the following iterative procedure that constructs a sequence of direct mechanisms,
M (1), . . . ,M (T ), where M (t) =
〈
x
(t)
(1,T ), p
(t)
(1,T )
〉
. We start with M (1) = M , and end up with M (T ) =
M ′ as the desirable symmetric direct mechanism.
Given that we have constructed M (1), . . . ,M (t), we define the equivalence relation ∼(t) between
any two histories as follows,
v(1,t′) ∼(t) v′(1,t′) ⇐⇒ Utl(M (t)|v(1,t′)) = Utl(M (t)|v′(1,t′)), (39)
and denote the expected revenue of future stages as pi
(t)
t′ (v(1,t′)). Formally,
pi
(t)
t′ (v(1,t′)) = Ev(t′+1,T )
[
T∑
τ=t′+1
p(t)τ (v(1,τ))
]
.
If T = 1, M = M (1) = M ′.
For T > 1, we construct M (t+1) from M (t) as follows.
8For M which is not that case, construct another M with the same allocation rules, but redefine payment rules
as: for t < T , pt(v(1,t)) = xt(v(1,t)) · vt; for t = T , pT (v(1,T )) = xT (v(1,T )) · vT −Utl(M |v(1,T )). Note that M is IC
and IR, and has the same allocation, overall utility, and overall revenue for any v(1,T ).
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• For any τ ≤ t, v(1,τ) ∈ V(1,τ), M (t+1) is the same with M (t),
x(t+1)τ (v(1,τ)) = x
(t)
τ (v(1,τ)), p
(t+1)
τ (v(1,τ)) = p
(t)
τ (v(1,τ)). (40)
• For any τ ≥ t+ 1, v(1,τ) ∈ V(1,τ), M (t+1) simulates what M (t) does at history v∗(1,t),
x(t+1)τ (v(1,τ)) = x
(t)
τ (v
∗
(1,t), v(t+1,τ)), p
(t+1)
τ (v(1,τ)) = p
(t)
τ (v
∗
(1,t), v(t+1,τ)), (41)
where v∗(1,t) = h
∗
t (v(1,t)) ∈ V(1,t) is the selected representative history for the equivalence class
[v(1,t)](t) defined by the equivalence relation (39), in order to satisfy
– the representative history v∗(1,t) is also in this equivalence class [v(1,t)](t),
Utl(M (t)|v∗(1,t)) = Utl(M (t)|v(1,t)); (42)
– the selection of the representative history is unique within each equivalnce class,
v(1,t) ∼(t) v′(1,t) =⇒ h∗t (v(1,t)) = h∗t (v′(1,t)); (43)
– the seller’s revenue at the representative history v∗(1,t) is no less than the expected revenue
in this equivalence class,
pi
(t)
t (v
∗
(1,t)) ≥ E
v′
(1,t)
[
pi
(t)
t (v
′
(1,t))
∣∣v′(1,t) ∼(t) v(1,t)]. (44)
We finally verify that the so constructed mechanism M ′ = M (T ) satisfies the desirable properties
by induction: (i) M ′ is symmetric; (ii) M ′ guarantees the same buyer utility as M does, and
generates revenue no less than M does.
For the inductive cases, we need to prove the following two properties, where (1) is identical
with property (i) when t = T , and property (ii) is implied if (2) holds for t ≤ T .
1. M (t) is symmetric for any pair of equivalent histories of length at most t− 1, i.e.,
∀τ ≤ t− 1, v(1,τ), v′(1,τ) ∈ V(1,τ), s.t. v(1,τ) ∼(t) v′(1,τ),
=⇒ ∀τ < t′ ≤ T, v(τ+1,t′) ∈ V(τ+1,t′),
{
x
(t)
t′ (v(1,t′)) = x
(t)
t′ (v
′
(1,τ), v(τ+1,t′))
p
(t)
t′ (v(1,t′)) = p
(t)
t′ (v
′
(1,τ), v(τ+1,t′))
, (45)
2. Utl(M (t)) = Utl(M (t−1)), Rev(M (t)) ≥ Rev(M (t−1)).
Base case: for t = 1, the properties hold trivially.
Assume by induction that the above two properties (1) and (2) hold for t = T < T , we prove
that for t = T + 1.
Property (2) holds. We first show that M (T+1) guarantees the same buyer utility as M (T) does.
For any history v(1,T) ∈ V(1,T), by the definition of the conditional expected utility,
Utl(M (T+1)|v(1,T)) = E
v(T+1,T )
[
T∑
τ=1
u(T+1)τ (v(1,τ); vτ )
]
=
T∑
τ=1
uτ (v(1,τ); vτ ) + E
v(T+1,T )
[
T∑
τ=T+1
u(T+1)τ (v(1,τ); vτ )
]
=
T∑
τ=1
u(T+1)τ (v(1,τ); vτ ) + U
(T+1)
T (v(1,T)). (46)
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Recall that by assumption (38), for t < T ,
xt(v(1,t)) · vt − pt(v(1,t)) = ut(v(1,t); vt) = 0.
According to construction (40) and (41), it is not hard to see that for τ ≤ T < T , there exists
some v′(1,τ−1) ∈ V(1,τ−1) such that,
u(T+1)τ (v(1,τ); vτ ) = x
(T+1)
τ (v(1,τ)) · vτ − p(T+1)τ (v(1,τ))
= xτ (v
′
(1,τ−1), vτ ) · vτ − pτ (v′(1,τ−1), vτ ) = 0.
Combining (46), we have
Utl(M (T+1)|v(1,T)) = U (T+1)T (v(1,T)). (47)
By construction (41), for τ ≥ T + 1, v∗(1,T) = h∗T(v(1,T)) being the representative history,
u(T+1)τ (v(1,τ); vτ ) = x
(T+1)
τ (v(1,τ)) · vτ − p(T+1)τ (v(1,τ))
= x(T)τ (v
∗
(1,T), v(T+1,τ)) · vτ − p(T)τ (v∗(1,T), v(T+1,τ)) = u(T)τ (v∗(1,T), v(T+1,τ); vτ ).
Hence
U
(T+1)
T (v(1,T)) = Ev(T+1,T )
[
T∑
τ=T+1
u(T+1)τ (v(1,τ); vτ )
]
= E
v(T+1,T )
[
T∑
τ=T+1
u(T)τ (v
∗
(1,T), v(T+1,τ); vτ )
]
= U
(T)
T (v
∗
(1,T)).
Similar with (47), we have
Utl(M (T)|v∗(1,T)) = U (T)T (v∗(1,T)).
Combine (47) and the two equations above,
Utl(M (T+1)|v(1,T)) = U (T+1)T (v(1,T)) = U (T)T (v∗(1,T)) = Utl(M (T)|v∗(1,T)).
Furthermore, by construction (42), we conclude that
∀v(1,T) ∈ V(1,T), Utl(M (T+1)|v(1,T)) = Utl(M (T)|v∗(1,T)) = Utl(M (T)|v(1,T)). (48)
Then (48) implies Utl(M (T+1)) = Utl(M (T)), i.e.,
Utl(M (T+1)) = E
v(1,T)
[
Utl
(
M (T+1)
∣∣v(1,T))] = E
v(1,T)
[
Utl
(
M (T)
∣∣v(1,T))] = Utl(M (T)).
We then show that M (T+1) generates revenue no less than M (T) does.
Recall that by construction (40), for τ ≤ T,
p(T+1)τ (v(1,τ)) = p
(T)
τ (v(1,τ)),
and by construction (41), for τ ≥ T + 1,
p(T+1)τ (v(1,τ)) = p
(T)
τ (v
∗
(1,T), v(T+1,τ)).
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Then according to the definition of pi, we have
pi
(T+1)
T (v(1,T)) = Ev(T+1,T )
[
T∑
τ=T+1
p(T+1)τ (v(1,τ))
]
= E
v(T+1,T )
[
T∑
τ=T+1
p(T)τ (v
∗
(1,T), v(T+1,τ))
]
= pi
(T)
T (v
∗
(1,T)).
Moreover, by definition,
Rev(M (T+1)) = E
v(1,T )
[
T∑
τ=1
p(T+1)τ (v(1,τ))
]
= E
v(1,T)
[
T∑
τ=1
p(T+1)τ (v(1,τ)) + Ev(T+1,T )
[
T∑
τ=T+1
p(T+1)τ (v(1,τ))
]]
= E
v(1,T)
[
T∑
τ=1
p(T+1)τ (v(1,τ)) + pi
(T+1)
T (v(1,T))
]
= E
v(1,T)
[
T∑
τ=1
p(T)τ (v(1,τ)) + pi
(T)
T
(
h∗T(v(1,T))
)]
(49)
For any fixed v(1,T) ∈ V(1,T), by the property (44) of the representative history v∗(1,T) =
h∗T
(
v(1,T)
)
, we have
E
v(1,T)
[
pi
(T)
T
(
h∗T(v(1,T))
)] ≥ E
v(1,T)
[
E
v′
(1,T)
[
pi
(T)
T (v
′
(1,T))
∣∣∣v′(1,T) ∼(T) v(1,T)]
]
= E
v′
(1,T)
[
E
v(1,T)
[
pi
(T)
T (v
′
(1,T))
∣∣∣v′(1,T) ∼(T) v(1,T)]]
= E
v′
(1,T)
[
pi
(T)
T (v
′
(1,T))
]
= E
v(1,T)
[
pi
(T)
T (v(1,T))
]
. (50)
By similar argument with (49),
Rev(M (T)) = E
v(1,T)
[
T∑
τ=1
p(T)τ (v(1,τ)) + pi
(T)
T (v(1,T))
]
.
Then combining (49) and (50),
Rev(M (T+1))−Rev(M (T)) = E
v(1,T)
[
pi
(T)
T
(
h∗T(v(1,T))
)]− E
v(1,T)
[
pi
(T)
T (v(1,T))
]
≥ 0.
In other words, Rev(M (T+1)) ≥ Rev(M (T)).
Proterty (1) holds.
Since the goal (45) has mathematically identical formulation on x and p, we prove (45) for x
only.
Consider the following cases:
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• For t′ ≤ T, it follows from the construction (40) and the inductive assumption (45) as follows,
∀τ < t′ ≤ T, v(1,t′) ∈ V(1,t′), v′(1,τ) ∼(T) v(1,τ),
x
(T+1)
t′ (v(1,t′)) = x
(T)
t′ (v(1,t′)) = x
(T)
t′ (v
′
(1,τ), v(τ+1,t′)) = x
(T+1)
t′ (v
′
(1,τ), v(τ+1,t′)).
Note that the second “=” comes from the inductive assumption (45) on t = T, where τ ≤
t− 1 = T− 1 is required.
• For t′ > T and τ < T, we show that v(1,τ) ∼(T+1) v′(1,τ) implies
v(1,T) ∼(T+1)
(
v′(1,τ), v(τ+1,T)
)
, (51)
and it reduces to the following τ = T case then.
Recall by (48), Utl(M (T+1)|v(1,T)) = Utl(M (T)|v(1,T)). Hence by the definition of conditional
expected utility,
Utl(M (T+1)|v(1,τ)) = E
v(τ+1,T)
[
Utl(M (T+1)|v(1,T))
]
= E
v(τ+1,T)
[
Utl(M (T)|v(1,T))
]
= Utl(M (T)|v(1,τ)).
Then v(1,τ) ∼(T+1) v′(1,τ) implies v(1,τ) ∼(T) v′(1,τ), since
Utl(M (T)|v(1,τ)) = Utl(M (T+1)|v(1,τ))
= Utl(M (T+1)|v′(1,τ)) = Utl(M (T)|v′(1,τ)).
By inductive assumption (45) (on t = T), the submechanisms of M (T) at history v(1,τ) and
v′(1,τ) are identical
9. Therefore10, for any v(τ+1,T ) ∈ V(τ+1,T ),
Utl(M (T)|v(1,T )) = Utl(M (T)|v′(1,τ), v(τ+1,T )).
It then suggests that v(1,T) and (v
′
(1,τ), v(τ+1,T)) are equivalent with respect to the equivalence
relation ∼(T), i.e.,
Utl(M (T)|v(1,T)) = E
v(T+1,T )
[
Utl(M (T)|v(1,T ))
]
= E
v(T+1,T )
[
Utl(M (T)|v′(1,τ), v(τ+1,T ))
]
= Utl(M (T)|v′(1,τ), v(τ+1,T )).
Again, by (48),
Utl(M (T+1)|v(1,T)) = Utl(M (T)|v(1,T))
= Utl(M (T)|v′(1,τ), v(τ+1,T )) = Utl(M (T+1)|v′(1,τ), v(τ+1,T )).
Hence we have proved (51), and it reduces to the following τ = T case.
9Note that the demonstration based on the inductive assumption on t = T only works for τ ≤ t−1 = T−1, which
is certainly true when the integer τ < T.
10By assumption (38) and construction (40) and (41), Utl(M (T)|v(1,T )) = u(T)T (v(1,T ); vT ), which equals to
u
(T)
T (v
′
(1,τ), v(τ+1,T ); vT ) because these two submechanisms are identical.
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• For t′ > T and τ = T, ∀v(1,T) ∼(T+1) v′(1,T), by (48), we have v(1,T) ∼(T) v′(1,T).
Then by the uniqueness (43) of the representative history, we have
h∗T(v(1,T)) = h
∗
T(v
′
(1,T)) = v
∗
(1,T).
According to construction (41), for any v(T+1,t′) ∈ V(T+1,t′),
x
(T+1)
t′ (v
′
(1,T), v(T+1,t′)) = x
(T)
t′ (v
∗
(1,T), v(T+1,t′)) = x
(T+1)
t′ (v(1,T), v(T+1,t′)).
Therefore, we have finished the proof of the inductive properties (1) and (2) for t = T + 1.
Hence M (T+1) is symmetric for any pair of equivalent histories of length at most T. Therefore,
by induction, M ′ = M (T ) is symmetric and,
Utl(M ′) = Utl(M (T )) = · · · = Utl(M (1)) = Utl(M)
Rev(M ′) ≥ Rev(M (T )) ≥ · · · ≥ Rev(M (1)) ≥ Rev(M).
In particular, by (40) and (41), if M is deterministic, M ′ is also deterministic.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3.10
Proof of Lemma 3.10. To prove that Bg,y is a BAM, we must verify the following,
• Bg,y is a valid bank account mechanism:
– Bg,y = 〈z(1,T ), q(1,T ), bal(1,T ), d(1,T ), s(1,T )〉 are defined on their domains.
– qt and dt are always non-negative.
– st(balt) is independent with vt, and no more than balt.
– The balance is updated according to formula (7).
• Bg,y is a BAM: IC and IR constraints (10)-(12) are satisfied.
We now verify these statements one by one.
• Since M is symmetric, then by definition,
∀t ∈ [T ], v(1,t), v′(1,t) ∈ V(1,t), Utl(M |v(1,t−1)) = Utl(M |v′(1,t−1)) =⇒ xt(v(1,t)) = xt(v′(1,t−1), vt).
Combining with the construction of balt and zt (see (14) and (15)), we have,
balt(v(1,t−1)) = bal′t(v(1,t−1))
=⇒ Utl(M |v(1,t−1)) = balt(v(1,t−1)) + µt−1 = balt(v′(1,t−1)) + µt−1 = Utl(M |v′(1,t−1))
=⇒ zt
(
balt(v(1,t−1)), vt
)
= xt(v(1,t)) = xt(v
′
(1,t−1), vt) = zt
(
balt(v
′
(1,t−1)), vt
)
,
which then suggests that zt(balt, vt) is a valid function, since for any input (balt, vt), zt is
never assigned two different values.
Then it is also true for qt and dt, since they are constructed based on zt (see (16) and (17)).
Also note that by construction (14), balt is always non-negative. Hence zt, qt, dt, and st are
defined on their domains (the first parameter is the balance — a non-negative real, and the
second parameter is the value vt).
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• By the construction of zt, (15), zt(balt, vt) = yt(v(1,t)). Then by the statement (19) in Lemma
3.10, zt(balt, vt) = yt(v(1,t)) = xt(v(1,t)). Since the symmetric direct mechanism M satisfies
IC condition (4), xt must be (weakly) increasing in vt.
By the construction of qt, (16), we have
qt(balt, vt) = zt(balt, vt) · vt −
∫ vt
0
zt(balt, v)dv ≥ 0.
By the construction of dt, (17), we have
dt(balt, vt) = uˆt(balt, vt; vt) =
∫ vt
0
zt(balt, v)dv ≥ 0.
Hence both of qt and dt are always non-negative.
• We claim that according to the construction of Bg,y, M is IC implies ∂st(balt)/∂vt = 0.
Formally, from the construction of st (18),
st(balt) = balt + dt(balt, vt)− balt+1.
By plugging the construction of dt and balt+1 into the formula above, we have
st(balt) = balt + uˆt(balt, vt; vt)− gt(v(1,t)) + µt
= balt + uˆt(balt, vt; vt)−
(
Utl(M |v(1,t))− µt
)
,
where the second “=” is from the statement (19).
Then by taking partial derivative with respect to vt on both sides, we have
∂st(balt)
∂vt
=
∂balt
∂vt
+
∂uˆt(balt, vt; vt)
∂vt
− ∂
(
Utl(M |v(1,t))− µt
)
∂vt
. (52)
By the construction of balt(v(1,t−1)), (14), balt is independent with vt, hence ∂balt/∂vt = 0.
Since uˆt(balt, vt; vt) =
∫ vt
0 zt(balt, v)dv, ∂uˆt(balt, vt; vt)/∂vt = zt(balt, vt).
Note that for τ ≤ t − 1, uτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ ) is independent with vt, and µt = infv′
(1,t)
gt(v
′
(1,t)) is
also independent with vt. Hence
∂
(
Utl(M |v(1,t))− µt
)
∂vt
=
∂
(∑t
τ=1 uτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ ) + Ut(v(1,t))− µt
)
∂vt
=
∂
(
ut(balt, vt; vt) + Ut(v(1,t))
)
∂vt
,
which then by (6) equals to xt(v(1,t)).
Now (52) reduces to the follows,
∂st(balt)
∂vt
=
∂balt
∂vt
+
∂uˆt(balt, vt; vt)
∂vt
− ∂
(
Utl(M |v(1,t))− µt
)
∂vt
= 0 + zt(balt, vt)− xt(v(1,t)) = 0.
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Recall that by construction, zt(balt, vt) = xt(v(1,t)).
Hence st constructed as (18) is a function of balt. By letting vt = 0, we show that st(balt) is
no more than balt,
st(balt) = balt + dt(balt,0)− balt+1(balt,0) ≤ balt + dt(balt,0) = balt,
where dt(balt,0) = uˆt(balt,0; 0) = 0.
• The balance update formula (7) is directly implied by the construction of st, (18).
• As we mentioned previously, zt(balt, vt) = xt(v(1,t)) is weakly increasing in vt. Then by
Envelope theorem, the construction of qt, (16), implies the in-stage IC condition (10).
• According to the construction of Bg,y, the fact that st(balt) is independent with vt implies
another IC condition (11). Formally, by adopting the construction of st, balt, and dt, we have
st(balt) = balt + dt(balt, vt)− balt+1
= Utl(M |v(1,t−1))− µt−1 + uˆt(balt, vt; vt)−
(
Utl(M |v(1,t))− µt
)
= Utl(M |v(1,t−1))−Utl(M |v(1,t)) + uˆt(balt, vt; vt)− µt−1 + µt.
Taking expectation over vt on both sides, we have
st(balt) = E
vt
[st(balt)]
= E
vt
[
Utl(M |v(1,t−1))−Utl(M |v(1,t)) + uˆt(balt, vt; vt)− µt−1 + µt
]
= E
vt
[
uˆt(balt, vt; vt)
]− µt−1 + µt,
which implies the IC condition (11), because µt−1 and µt are two constants with respect to
balt and v(1,t).
Note that the first “=” comes from the fact that st(balt) is independent with vt. For the
second “=”, we use the fact that
E
vt
[
Utl(M |v(1,t))
]
= E
vt
[
E
v(t+1,T )
[
Utl(M |v(1,T ))
]]
= E
v(t,T )
[
Utl(M |v(1,T ))
]
= Utl(M |v(1,t−1)).
• Finally, the construction of dt, (17), directly implies the IR condition (12).
Note thatM andBg,y are equivalent in allocation rule, xt(v(1,t)) = zt(balt, vt). Hence Eff(B
g,y) =
Eff(M). Then we show that they are also equivalent on buyer utility to conclude that they are
also equivalent on revenue.
Recall that by definition,
Utl(Bg,y|v(1,T )) =
T∑
τ=1
zτ (balτ , vτ ) · vτ −
T∑
τ=1
qt(balτ , vτ )−
T∑
τ=1
sτ (balτ )
=
T∑
τ=1
((
zτ (balτ , vτ ) · vτ − qt(balτ , vτ )
)− sτ (balτ ))
=
T∑
τ=1
(
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ )− sτ (balτ )
)
.
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Furthermore, by the construction of dt and st (see (17) and (18)), we have
Utl(Bg,y|v(1,T )) =
T∑
τ=1
(
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ )− sτ (balτ )
)
=
T∑
τ=1
(
dτ (balτ , vτ )−
(
balτ + dτ (balτ , vτ )− balτ+1
))
=
T∑
τ=1
(
balτ+1 − balτ
)
= balT+1 − bal1.
Note that by definition, bal1 = 0, and
balT+1 = Utl(M |v(1,T ))− µT = Utl(M |v(1,T ))−min
{
0, inf
v′
(1,T )
Utl(M |v′(1,T ))
}
= Utl(M |v(1,T )),
where µT = 0, because Utl(M |v′(1,T )) ≥ 0 by the IR condition (3).
Therefore
Utl(Bg,y|v(1,T )) = balT+1 − bal1 = Utl(M |v(1,T )),
which then implies
Utl(Bg,y) = Utl(M),
Rev(Bg,y) = Rev(M).
A.7 Proof of Theorem 3.11
Before conducting the proof, we first give some intuitions behind the theorem as follows,
• gt is convex in vt and weakly increasing in vt: then gt(v(1,t−1), vt) is the utility function of
some IC and IR stage mechanism for stage vt, by the Envelope theorem.
• gt is consistent: then gt(v(1,t)) can be considered as the conditional utility Utl(M |v(1,t)) plus
a constant for some direct mechanism M , i.e.,
gt(v(1,t)) = Utl(M |v(1,t)) + constant.
• If gt is further symmetric: then the direct mechanism M above is a symmetric direct mecha-
nism.
• Finally, if yt is the sub-gradient of gt with respect to vt and its range is Xt: then yt is exactly
the allocation function of the M .
In other words, Bg,y is a core BAM, if and only if there is a symmetric direct mechanism M
such that g equals to its conditional utility plus some constants (one for each stage), and y is its
allocation function.
The proof of Theorem 3.11 is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.10. The following corollary
summarizes the important conclusions we have until the end of Section 3.
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Corollary A.1. Let M be a revenue-optimal direct mechanism, subject to IC, IR, and with fixed
buyer utility. One can construct a symmetric (Lemma 3.7), stage-wise IC and stage-wise IR
(Lemma 2.2 to 2.4) mechanism M ′ that yields the same revenue and guarantees the same buyer
utility. Furthermore, M ′ can be induced by a Core BAM (Theorem 3.5, Lemma 3.3 and 3.4).
Proof of Theorem 3.11. “=⇒”: y is the sub-gradient of g and g is consistent, symmetric, and convex
and increasing in vt, =⇒ Bg,y is a Core BAM.
By Definition 3.9, we need to show that Bg,y is a valid BAM. The following proof is almost the
same with the proof of Lemma 3.10, so we only outline the differences here.
• Since g is symmetric,
gt−1(v(1,t−1)) = gt−1(v′(1,t−1)) =⇒ gt(v(1,t)) = gt(v′(1,t−1), vt),
and yt is the sub-gradient of gt with respect to vt, so by the construction (14) of balt
balt(v(1,t−1)) = balt(v′(1,t−1)) =⇒ gt−1(v(1,t−1)) = gt−1(v′(1,t−1))
=⇒ yt(v(1,t)) =
∂gt(v(1,t))
∂vt
=
∂gt(v
′
(1,t−1), vt)
∂vt
= yt(v
′
(1,t−1), vt),
which then implies zt(balt, vt) = yt(v(1,t)) is a valid function on input (balt, vt). Also note that
the range of yt (hence the range of zt(balt, vt)) is Xt by definition.
• zt, qt, dt, and st are defined on their domains; qt and dt are always non-negative: the same
with the proof of Lemma 3.10.
• By the construction of st, balt, dt, and zt (see (18), (14), (17) and (15)),
st(balt) = balt + dt(balt, vt)− balt+1
= gt−1(v(1,t−1))− µt−1 +
∫ vt
0
zt(balt, v)dv − gt(v(1,t)) + µt
= gt−1(v(1,t−1)) +
∫ vt
0
yt(v(1,t−1), v)dv − gt(v(1,t))− µt−1 + µt.
Taking partial derivative with respect to vt, we have
∂st(balt)
vt
= 0 + yt(v(1,t))−
∂g(v(1,t))
∂vt
− 0 + 0.
Since yt(v(1,t)) = ∂gt(v(1,t))/∂vt, we conclude that ∂st(balt)/∂vt = 0. Hence st constructed as
(18) is a function of balt.
• st(balt) ≤ balt; the balance update formula holds: the same with the proof of Lemma 3.10.
• Since zt(balt, vt) = yt(v(1,t)) is the sub-gradient of gt(v(1,t)) with respect to vt, which is also
convex and weakly increasing in vt, then by the Envelope theorem, the construction (16) of
qt implies the in-stage IC condition (10).
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• gt is consistent implies that st(balt)− Evt [uˆt(balt, vt; vt)] is a constant, i.e.,
st(balt)− E
vt
[uˆt(balt, vt; vt)] = E
vt
[st(balt)− dt(balt, vt)]
= E
vt
[(
balt + dt(balt, vt)− balt+1
)− dt(balt, vt)]
= E
vt
[balt − balt+1]
= E
vt
[
gt−1(v(1,t−1))− µt−1 − gt(v(1,t)) + µt
]
= gt−1(v(1,t−1))− E
vt
[
gt(v(1,t))
]− µt−1 + µt
= constant,
where the last “=” is from the consistency of gt and the fact that µt−1 and µt are constants.
It then implies the IC condition (11).
• The IR condition (12) holds: the same with the proof of Lemma 3.10.
“⇐=”: Bg,y is a core BAM =⇒ y is the sub-gradient of g and g is consistent, symmetric, and
convex and increasing in vt.
By definition, the Core BAM Bg,y is a valid BAM. Most of the arguments for the sufficient
direction also apply to the necessary direction.
• By the construction (14)-(18),
∂st(balt)
vt
= yt(v(1,t))−
∂g(v(1,t))
∂vt
,
which must be 0, since st(balt) is invariant with respect to vt. Hence yt is the sub-gradient
of gt with respect to vt, i.e.,
yt(v(1,t)) =
∂g(v(1,t))
∂vt
.
• Since st(balt) = balt+dt(balt, vt)−balt+1 is a valid function on input (balt), hence ∀v(1,t−1), v′(1,t−1) ∈
V(1,t−1), vt ∈ Vt,
balt(v(1,t−1)) = balt(v′(1,t−1)) =⇒ st
(
balt(v(1,t−1))
)
= st
(
balt(v
′
(1,t−1))
)
.
By substituting st(balt), we have
balt(v(1,t−1)) + dt(balt, vt)− balt+1(v(1,t)) = balt(v′(1,t−1)) + dt(balt, vt)− balt+1(v′(1,t−1), vt),
which then implies
balt+1(v(1,t)) = balt+1(v
′
(1,t−1), vt),
since balt(v(1,t−1)) = balt(v′(1,t−1)).
Note that by the construction of balt,
balt(v(1,t−1)) = balt(v′(1,t−1)) ⇐⇒ gt−1(v(1,t−1)) = gt−1(v′(1,t−1)),
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and
balt+1(v(1,t)) = balt+1(v
′
(1,t−1), vt) ⇐⇒ gt(v(1,t)) = gt(v′(1,t−1), vt).
Hence gt must be symmetric, i.e., ∀v(1,t−1), v′(1,t−1) ∈ V(1,t−1), vt ∈ Vt,
gt−1(v(1,t−1)) = gt−1(v′(1,t−1)) =⇒ balt(v(1,t−1)) = balt(v′(1,t−1))
=⇒ balt+1(v(1,t)) = balt+1(v′(1,t−1), vt)
=⇒ gt(v(1,t)) = gt(v′(1,t−1), vt).
• Since the range of zt(balt, vt) must be Xt, so is the range of yt(v(1,t)).
• By the in-stage IC condition (10) and the Envelope theorem, yt(v(1,t) must be weakly increas-
ing in vt, hence gt, being the integration of yt, must be convex and increasing in vt.
• Finally, the another IC condition (11) implies that st(balt) − Evt
[
uˆt(balt, vt; vt)
]
must be a
constant (with respect to balt). Hence,
gt−1(v(1,t−1))− E
vt
[
gt(v(1,t))
]
= balt + µt−1 − E
vt
[balt+1 + µt]
= st(balt)− E
vt
[
dt(balt, vt; vt)
]
+ µt−1 − µt
= st(balt)− E
vt
[
uˆt(balt, vt; vt)
]
+ µt−1 − µt
= constant.
Therefore gt is consistent.
A.8 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Assume by contradiction that there exists a core BAM, B, such that,
Rev(B) > Rev(MS) + E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sτ (balτ )
]
. (53)
Then we construct a mechanism M that operates independently on each stage but generates strictly
higher revenue than the optimal separate mechanism in at least one stage.
To ensure that the constructed mechanism is history-independent and IC-IR within each single
stage. We create a fake bank account to mimic the behavior of the real bank account in B. One
can think of the balance bal†t of the fake bank account as simply a number, satisfying that the
distribution of bal†t is the same as the distribution of the real balance (as a random-valued function
of previous types).
Consider the following construction of M based on B.
xt(vt) = zt(bal
†
t , vt), pt(vt) = qt(bal
†
t , vt),
where in each stage t, bal†t is a random variable defined by the following equations for τ from 1 to
t− 1.
bal†τ+1 = bal
†
τ − sτ (bal†τ ) + dτ (bal†τ , v†τ ), v†τ ∼ Fτ .
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Thus bal†t is independent of the buyer’s real types, and has the same distribution as balt. Note that
vt is independent of the history, hence independent of balt as well. Then
E
v(1,t−1)
[qt(balt, vt)] = E
bal†t
[qt(bal
†
t , vt)] = E
bal†t
[pt(vt)],
=⇒ Rev(M) =
T∑
τ=1
E
bal†τ ,vτ
[
pτ (vτ )
]
= Rev(B)− E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
sτ (balτ )
]
> Rev(MS)
=⇒ ∃τ, s.t. E
bal†τ ,vτ
[
pτ (vτ )
]
> ρτ , (54)
namely, at least in one stage τ , M generates strictly higher revenue than the optimal revenue for
stage τ , ρτ .
By construction, M is history-independent, and by (10)(12) and qt ≥ 0 (by the construction of
core BAM), M is also IC and IR within each single stage. Thus (54) contradicts the optimality of
MS.
A.9 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof of Lemma 4.2. From previous definition and analysis, we have two upper bounds on st(balt).
1. By Definition 3.1, st(balt) ≤ balt.
2. By IC constraint (11) of BAM, we have
st(balt) = E
vt
[uˆt(balt, vt; vt)− uˆ(0, vt; vt)] + st(0) ≤ E
vt
[uˆt(balt, vt; vt)] = Valt.
For any balt, the minimum of the above two bounds can be achieved if
E
vt
[uˆ(balt, vt; vt)] = min {balt,Valt}
uˆ(0, vt; vt) = st(0) = 0.
Furthermore, by IR constraint (12), we have,
dt(balt, vt) ≤ uˆt(balt, vt; vt) ≤ Valt.
A.10 Proof of Lemma 4.3
We prove the following stronger version of Lemma 4.3. Lemma 4.3 is then directly implied by
Lemma 4.2 and Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.2. For deposit sequence d(1,t) and spend sequence s(1,t) with given bounds on each of
the deposits and spends,
∀τ ∈ [t], 0 ≤ dτ ≤ 1 · vτ , sτ ≤ Valτ ,
and the corresponding balance defined with respect to the balance update formula,
bal1 = 0, balτ+1 = balτ + dτ − sτ , sτ ≤ balτ , ∀τ ∈ [t].
We have the following upper bound on the cumulated spends,
∀v(1,t) ∈ V(1,t),
t∑
τ=1
sτ ≤
t∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ). (55)
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Proof of Lemma A.2. Let t′ ≤ t be the largest element such that s∗t′(bal∗t′) = bal∗t′ . Then according
to the balance update formula,
t∑
τ=1
sτ = st′ +
t∑
τ=t′+1
sτ +
t′−1∑
τ=1
(balτ + dτ − balτ+1)
= st′ +
t∑
τ=t′+1
sτ + bal1 − balt′ +
t′−1∑
τ=1
dτ .
Remember that by definition, bal1 = bal
∗
1 = 0, and the upper bounds on dτ and sτ ,
∀τ ∈ [t], dτ ≤ 1 · vτ , sτ ≤ balτ , sτ ≤ Valτ .
Hence
t∑
τ=1
sτ = st′ +
t∑
τ=t′+1
sτ + bal1 − balt′ +
t′−1∑
τ=1
dτ
≤ balt′ +
t∑
τ=t′+1
Valτ + bal1 − balt′ +
t′−1∑
τ=1
1 · vτ
=
t∑
τ=t′+1
Valτ +
t′−1∑
τ=1
1 · vτ . (56)
Recall the construction of d∗ and s∗,
∀τ ∈ [t], d∗τ (bal∗τ , vτ ) = 1 · vτ , s∗τ (bal∗τ ) = min{bal∗τ ,Valτ}.
Combining the definition of t′, we have
∀τ > t′, s∗τ (bal∗τ ) = Valτ .
Therefore, apply the balance update formula again,
t∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ) = s
∗
t′(bal
∗
t′) +
t∑
τ=t′+
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ) +
t′−1∑
τ=1
(
bal∗τ + d
∗
τ (bal
∗
τ , vτ )− bal∗τ+1
)
= bal∗t′ +
t∑
τ=t′+1
Valτ + bal
∗
1 − bal∗t′ +
t′−1∑
τ=1
1 · vτ
=
t∑
τ=t′+1
Valτ +
t′−1∑
τ=1
1 · vτ ,
which, by (56), is the upper bound on
∑t
τ=1 sτ .
Thus we conclude that
t∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ) ≥
t∑
τ=1
sτ .
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A.11 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Proof of Lemma 4.4. We prove that the constructed B (by Mechanism 1) is a BAM.
With parameter θ = 3st(balt) = 3 min{balt,Valt/3} ≤ Valt, 〈xPt (θ, ·), pPt (θ, ·)〉 is the posted-
price-for-the-grand-bundle mechanism for stage t with non-negative posted-price by definition.
Hence zt, qt, dt, st, are defined on the domains required by the definition of bank account mech-
anism.
Within each single stage and for any balance balt, stage mechanism 〈zt(balt, ·), qt(balt, ·)〉 is
truthful, because it is a randomization of three truthful stage mechanisms: the optimal history-
independent mechanism, the give-for-free mechanism, and the posted-price-for-the-grand-bundle
mechanism with a parameter independent with the reported type on current stage, vt. Hence B
satisfies the IC constraint (10).
Another IC constraint (11) is verified as follows,
E
vt
[
uˆt(balt, vt; vt)− uˆt(bal′t, vt; vt)
]
=
1
3
E
vt
[(
zt(balt, vt) · vt − qt(balt, vt)
)− (zt(bal′t, vt) · vt − qt(bal′t, vt))]
=
1
3
E
vt
[(
xSt (vt) + 1 + x
P
t
(
3st(balt), vt
)) · vt − (pSt (vt) + pPt (3st(balt), vt))]
− 1
3
E
vt
[(
xSt (vt) + 1 + x
P
t
(
3st(bal
′
t), vt
)) · vt − (pSt (vt) + pPt (3st(bal′t), vt))]
=
1
3
(
E
vt
[
uPt (3st(balt), vt; vt)
]− E
vt
[
uPt (3st(bal
′
t), vt; vt)
])
.
By the definition of the posted-price-for-the-grand-bundle mechanism with parameter θ, the
buyer utility uPt (θ, vt; vt) = θ (see (21)), hence
E
vt
[
uˆt(balt, vt; vt)− uˆt(bal′t, vt; vt)
]
=
1
3
(
E
vt
[
uPt (3st(balt), vt; vt)
]− E
vt
[
uPt (3st(bal
′
t), vt; vt)
])
=
1
3
(
3st(balt)− 3st(bal′t)
)
= st(balt)− st(bal′t) =⇒ (11).
By Lemma 3.3, conditions (10) and (11) are sufficient conditions of stage-wise IC, so we have
proved the IC property of B.
Finally, by the construction of zt, qt, and dt, (see (22), (23), and (24) respectively), we can
prove the IR constraint (12) as follows. Hence B is a BAM.
uˆt(balt, vt; vt) =
1
3
(
uSt (vt) + 1 · vt + uPt
(
3st(balt), vt; vt
)) ≥ 1
3
vt · 1 = dt(balt, vt) =⇒ (12).
A.12 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Since sσt (bal
σ
t ) = 0 if σt = 0, we cannot prove the lemma by arguing s
σ
t (bal
σ
t ) ≥
s∗t (bal
∗
t )/4. Even if when σt = 1, it is still nearly impossible to argue for similar lower bounds of
sσt (bal
σ
t ), because bal
σ
t — the upper bound of s
σ
t (bal
σ
t ) — depends on the first t− 1 bits of σ, which
have 2t−1 different cases.
The trick here is to consider a pair of σ’s, say σ and σ(t), and to argue that if σt = 1, then
sσt (bal
σ
t ) + s
σ(t)
t (bal
σ(t)
t ) ≥ s∗t (bal∗t ).
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In particular, for any σ ∈ {0, 1}T and t ∈ [T ], let σ(t) = σ1 · · ·σt−1σt · · ·σT , which is different
from σ in the first t− 1 bits, and the same with σ in the rest of the bits.
In order to use Lemma A.2, consider the following deposit sequence, d(1,t−1), and spend sequence,
s(1,t−1),
∀τ < t, dτ = dστ (balστ , vτ ) + dσ(t)τ (balσ(t), vτ ), sτ = sστ (balστ ) + sσ(t)τ (balσ(t)). (57)
Recall the definitions of dστ and s
σ
τ , i.e.,
if στ = 0 : d
σ
τ (bal
σ
τ , vτ ) = 1 · vτ , sστ (balστ ) = 0;
if στ = 1 : d
σ
τ (bal
σ
τ , vτ ) = 0, s
σ
τ (bal
σ
τ ) = min{balστ ,Valτ}.
Hence
∀τ < t, dτ = 1 · vτ , sτ =
{
min{balστ ,Valτ}, if στ = 1
min{balσ(t)τ ,Valτ}, if στ = 0
. (58)
Consider the following balance bal(1,t) defined by d(1,t−1) and s(1,t−1),
bal1 = 0, balτ+1 = balτ + dτ − sτ ,∀τ ∈ [t− 1].
By (57), it is not hard to demonstrate the fact below through induction from τ = 1 to τ = t,
∀τ ∈ [t], balτ = balστ + balσ(t)τ . (59)
Also note that from (58), we have
∀τ < t, dτ = 1 · vτ , sτ ≤ Valτ .
Hence the following inequality is from Lemma A.2,
t−1∑
τ=1
sτ ≤
t−1∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ). (60)
Apply the balance update formula (7) recursively,
balt = bal1 +
t−1∑
τ=1
dτ −
t−1∑
τ=1
sτ .
Combining bal1 = 0 (by definition), (58), (59), and (60), we have
balσt + bal
σ(t)
t = balt ≥ 0 +
t−1∑
τ=1
1 · vτ −
t−1∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ),
where by the definition of d∗(1,T ) and s
∗
(1,T ),
0 +
t−1∑
τ=1
1 · vτ −
t−1∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ) = bal
∗
1 +
t−1∑
τ=1
d∗τ (bal
∗
τ , vτ )−
t−1∑
τ=1
s∗τ (bal
∗
τ ) = bal
∗
t ,
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hence
∀v(1,t) ∈ V(1,t), balσt + balσ(t)t ≥ bal∗t . (61)
Note that σ agrees with σ(t) on the t-th bit, namely, if σt = 1, then by construction of B
σ,
∀v(1,t) ∈ V(1,t),
sσt (bal
σ
t ) + s
σ(t)
t (bal
σ(t)
t ) = min{balσt ,Valt}+ min{balσ(t)t ,Valt}
≥ min{balσt + balσ(t)t ,Valt}
≥ min{bal∗t ,Valt} = s∗t (bal∗t ), (62)
where the last inequality is from (61).
Now we are ready to finish the proof. ∀t ∈ [T ], v(1,t) ∈ V(1,t),
E
σ
[
sσt (bal
σ
t )
]
= E
σ
[
sσt (bal
σ
t )
∣∣∣σt = 1] · Pr[σt = 1] + E
σ
[
sσt (bal
σ
t )
∣∣∣σt = 0] · Pr[σt = 0]
=
1
2
E
σ
[
sσt (bal
σ
t )
∣∣∣σt = 1]+ 0
=
1
4
E
σ
[
sσt (bal
σ
t ) + s
σ(t)
t (bal
σ(t)
t )
∣∣∣σt = 1]
≥ 1
4
s∗t (bal
∗
t ),
where the last inequality is from (62).
A.13 Proof of Theorem 6.1
Proof of Theorem 6.1. By Theorem 3.5, it is WLOG to assume that the optimal mechanism is
a core BAM Bg,y. Moreover, by Theorem 3.11 and Lemma 3.10, it is WLOG to assume that
g(h) = Utl(B|h). Since y is the sub-gradient of g and g is symmetric, we denote zt(balt, vt) by
yt
(
g(v(1,t−1)), vt
)
throughout the proof.
Let φt(ξ) be defined as follows,
φt(ξ) = max
B:g(v(1,t))=ξ
E
v(t+1,T )
[ T∑
τ=t+1
yt
(
g(v(1,τ−1)), vτ
) · vτ − balT+1]. (63)
Consider the following program.
maximize E
vt
[
yt(ξ, vt) · vt + φt
(
g(ξ, vt)
)]
(64)
subject to uˆt(ξ, vt; vt) ≥ uˆt(ξ, v′t; vt), ∀vt ∈ Vt (65)
g(ξ, vt) = ξ + uˆt(ξ, vt; vt)− E
v′t
[
uˆt(ξ, v
′
t; v
′
t)
]
(66)
g(ξ, vt) ≥ 0, ∀vt ∈ Vt (67)
where
Lemma A.3. maxξ≥0 φ0(ξ) is the maximum expected revenue, and φt−1(ξ) is computed based on
φt according to the above program (64), where the entire algorithm is essentially a dynamic program
starting with φT (ξ) = −balT+1 = −ξ.11
11Recall that µT = 0, hence balT+1 = Utl(B|v(1,T )).
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Proof of Lemma A.3. According to the construction of Lemma 3.10,
max
ξ≥0
φ0(ξ) = max
B:Utl(B)≥0
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
yt
(
Utl(B|v(1,τ−1)), vτ
) · vτ − balT+1]
= max
B
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
(
uˆτ (balτ , vτ ; vτ ) + qτ (balτ , vτ )
)
− balT+1
]
= max
B
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
dτ (balτ , vτ )− balT+1 +
T∑
τ=1
qτ (balτ , vτ )
]
= max
B
E
v(1,T )
[ T∑
τ=1
(
sτ (balτ ) + qτ (balτ , vτ )
)
− bal1
]
= max
B
Rev(B).
Hence maxξ≥0 φ0(ξ) is the maximum expected revenue.
In the meanwhile,
• (65) ⇐⇒ g is convex in vt;
• (66) ⇐⇒ g is consistent;
• the definition of uˆt and (66) ⇐⇒ yt is the sub-gradient of g(ξ, vt);
• finally, by the assumption that g(h) = Utl(B|h), g must be symmetric, and non-negative,
while (67) guarantees that φt(g(ξ, vt)) is valid, since φt is not defined on negative inputs.
In summary, by Theorem 3.11, Bg,y is a core BAM (with assuming g(h) = Utl(B|h)), if and only
if ∀t ∈ [T ], (g, y) is feasible in program (64).
Particularly, for one item per stage case, ∀t ∈ [T ], Vt = R+, the buyer has discrete stage type
distribution for each stage, i.e.,
∀t ∈ [T ], ∃v1t < · · · < vktt ∈ Vt, s.t.
kt∑
i=1
Pr
v∼Ft
[v = vit] = 1.
Then program (64) reduces to the following forms, i.e.,
maximize E
vt
[
yt(ξ, vt) · vt + φt
(
g(ξ, vt)
)]
subject to yt(ξ, vt) =
∫ vt
0
wt(ξ, v)dv∫
Vt
wt(ξ, v)dv = 1
g(ξ, vt) = ξ + uˆt(ξ, vt; vt)− E
v′t
[
uˆt(ξ, v
′
t; v
′
t)
]
g(ξ, vt) ≥ 0, wt(ξ, vt) ≥ 0, ∀vt ∈ Vt.
Lemma A.4. For one item per stage case, the allocation rule must be a randomization of posted-
price mechanisms.
Particularly, for discrete valuation distribution cases, it is WLOG to restrict to the convex com-
binations of posted-price mechanisms with the prices only from the set of discrete types, v1t , . . . , v
kt
t .
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While for discrete valuation distributions, WLOG, suppose that v1t = 0, then the program
further reduces to the following form, where Prit denotes the probability of type v
i
t on stage t, i.e.,
Prit = Prv∼Ft [v = vit].
maximize
kt∑
i=1
Prit ·
(
yit · vit + φt
(
git
))
subject to yit =
i∑
j=1
wjt
kt∑
i=1
wit = 1
uˆit =
i∑
j=1
wjt (v
i
t − vjt )
git = ξ + uˆ
i
t −
kt∑
j=1
Prit · uˆjt
git ≥ 0, wit ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , kt.
Denote the value of the program by value(ξ, φt, wt), and the optimal value by Prog(ξ, φt) =
maxwt value(ξ, φt, wt), where ξ and φt are parameters (φt is a function) of the program, and
wt = (w
1
t , . . . , w
kt
t ) are the variables (others are all determined by wt). Note that wt takes dif-
ferent values for different parameters.
This program is a linear program, if φt is a concave and piece-wise linear function. Moreover,
the LP is of polynomial size, if φt has at most polynomially many pieces.
Then the following lemma completes our proof that for any  > 0, the LP-based algorithm
achieves an -approximation by solving at most O(TN/) many LPs, and each LP of size at most
O(ktN/).
Lemma A.5. φt(ξ) is concave, and can be κ-approximated by two concave piece-wise linear func-
tions, φ
t
(ξ) and φt(ξ). Formally,
∀ξ, φ
t
(ξ) ≤ φt(ξ) ≤ φt(ξ), φt(ξ)− φt(ξ) ≤ κmaxζ φt(ζ),
where the number of pieces of φ
t
and φt is bounded by O(N + 1/κ).
Proof of Lemma A.5. We first show that φt(ξ) is concave. Let B and B
′ be the sub-BAMs
from stage t + 1 to T that reach φt(ξ) and φt(ξ
′) respectively. Note that Ev(t+1,T ) [balT+1] =
Ev(t+1,T ) [Utl(B|v(1,T ))] = Utl(B|v(1,t)) = ξ. Then for any η ∈ [0, 1], ξ′′ = ηξ + (1− η)ξ′,
φt(ξ
′′) ≥ E
v(t+1,T )
[ T∑
τ=t+1
y′′t · vτ − bal′′T+1
]
= E
v(t+1,T )
[ T∑
τ=t+1
(
ηyt + (1− η)y′t
) · vτ]− ξ′′
= ηφt(ξ) + (1− η)φt(ξ′),
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where y′′t is a convex combination of yt and y′t. Note that in general, the convex combination of
two BAMs (B and B′) is not a BAM, because it might not be symmetric. However, by Theorem
3.5, there is a BAM that admits the same expected utility, ξ′′, and better expected efficiency. In
other words, y′′t might indicate a mechanism that is not a BAM, but there is a BAM that generates
higher revenue than this mechanism. Hence φt(ξ
′′) is even larger.
Then by the following lemma, we could efficiently compute φ
t−1 and φt−1 from given φt and φt.
Hence we get an LP-based algorithm to achieve an arbitrarily close approximation to the optimal
mechanism.
Lemma A.6. For any concave function ϕ defined on interval [a, b], if
• ϕ(a) and ϕ(b) are given;
• there exist |βa| ≤ +∞ and |βb| ≤ +∞ such that
ϕ(ξ) ≤ βa(ξ − a) + ϕ(a), ϕ(ξ) ≤ βb(ξ − b) + ϕ(b);
then for any κ > 0, a pair of lower and upper bounds, ϕ and ϕ can be computed via O(n) queries
to the evaluation oracle of ϕ, such that
• let β = (ϕ(b)− ϕ(a))/(b− a), then
n ≤ 4
κ
+ log
(βa − βb)2
(βa − β)(βb − β) ;
• both of ϕ and ϕ are concave and piece-wise linear and have at most O(n) pieces;
• the gap between ϕ and ϕ is δ = (maxζ ϕ(ζ)−min{ϕ(a), ϕ(b)})κ.
Suppose we have lower and upper bounds for φt, i.e., φt ≤ φt ≤ φt. Then the functions
φ∗
t−1(ξ) = Prog(ξ, φt) and φ
∗
t−1(ξ) = Prog(ξ, φt) are lower and upper bounds for φt−1, respectively,
i.e.,
Prog(ξ, φ
t
) = value(ξ, φ
t
, w∗t ) ≤ value(ξ, φt, w∗t ) ≤ value(ξ, φt, w∗t ) ≤ Prog(ξ, φt) = φt−1(ξ),
Prog(ξ, φt) = value(ξ, φt, w
∗
t ) ≥ value(ξ, φt, w∗t ) ≥ value(ξ, φt, w∗t ) ≥ Prog(ξ, φt) = φt−1(ξ).
Let φ
t−1 be the lower bound of φ
∗
t−1 and φt−1 be the upper bound of φ
∗
t−1. So φt−1 ≤ φt−1 ≤ φt−1,
and the gap is bounded as follows,
φt−1 − φt−1 = (φt−1 − φ
∗
t−1) + (φ
∗
t−1 − φ∗t−1) + (φ∗t−1 − φt−1)
≤ κ+ 2(T − t)κ+ κ = 2(T − t+ 1)κ,
where
φ
∗
t−1 − φ∗t−1 = value(ξ, φt−1, w∗t−1)− value(ξ, φt−1, w∗t−1)
≤ value(ξ, φt−1, w∗t−1)− value(ξ, φt−1, w∗t−1)
=
kt−1∑
i=1
Prit−1 ·
(
φt−1(g
i
t−1(w
∗
t−1))− φt−1(git−1(w∗t−1))
)
≤ max
ζ≥0
(
φt−1(ζ)− φt−1(ζ)
) ≤ 2(T − t)κ.
Hence the gap between φ
0
and φ0 is bounded by Tκ.
Let N be the input size of the problem. Then we prove that
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• Lemma A.6 can be used to approximate φ∗
t−1 and φ
∗
t−1 with φt and φt being given;
• the multiplicative -approximation can be achieved by letting κ = 4/T ;
• the entire algorithm needs to solve O((N +T/)T ) many LPs, each of size at most O((T/+
N)kt
)
.
We verify that φt(ξ) satisfies the requirements for Lemma A.6. Consider the boundary estima-
tion of φt(ξ). Note that by assumption, v
1
t = 0, hence uˆ
1
t = 0. Then
g1t ≥ 0 =⇒
kt∑
j=1
Prit · uˆjt ≤ ξ.
Meanwhile, for i < kt,
yit =
i∑
j=1
wjt ≤ max
i′≤i
1
vi+1t − vi′t
·
i∑
j=1
(vi+1t − vjt )wjt ≤
1
vi+1t − vit
· uˆi+1t
=⇒
kt∑
i=1
Prit · yit · vit ≤ Prktt · yktt · vktt +
kt−1∑
i=1
Prit · uˆi+1t ·
vi+1t
vi+1t − vit
≤ Prktt · vktt + max
i<kt
Pritv
i+1
t
Pri+1t (v
i+1
t − vit)
·
kt∑
i=1
Prit · uˆit ≤ Prktt · vktt + ct · ξ,
where ct = maxi<kt(Pr
i
tv
i
t)/((v
i
t − vi−1t )Pri+1t ) < +∞. Combining with the concavity of φt+1, we
conclude that
φt(ξ) ≤ Prktt · vktt + ct · ξ + φt+1(ξ) ≤ · · · ≤ ξ
T∑
τ=t
cτ +
T∑
τ=t
Prkττ · vkττ . (68)
Meanwhile, when ξ = 0, uˆit ≤ 0 =⇒ w1t = · · · = wkt−1t = 0, wktt = 1. Hence
φt(0) = Pr
kt
t · vktt + φt+1(0) = · · · =
T∑
τ=t
Prkττ · vkττ , (69)
which meets the upper bound (68) of φt at ξ = 0.
By letting y1t = · · · = yktt = 1, we know that when ξ ≥
∑T
τ=t Valτ , g
i
t ≥
∑T
τ=t+1 Valτ . Then by
backward induction from T , for large enough ξ ≥ ∑Tτ=t Valτ , φt(ξ) = ∑Tτ=t Valτ − ξ. Since φt is
concave, it is further upper bounded as follows,
φt(ξ) ≤
T∑
τ=t
Valτ − ξ. (70)
In summary, φt is a concave function on interval
[
0,
∑T
τ=t Valτ
]
, and the function values on two
ends are
∑T
τ=t Pr
kτ
τ ·vkττ and 0, respectively. Moreover, it also has two upper bounds, (68)(70), that
go through the two ends respectively. Hence, βa =
∑T
τ=t, and βb = −1. So
log
(βa − βb)2
(βa − β)(βb − β) = O(N).
Then by Lemma A.6, φt(ξ) can be 2(T − t)κ-approximated by φt(ξ) and φt(ξ) with at most
O( 1κ +N) many queries to φt+1(ξ) and φt+1(ξ).
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Therefore, there is an LP-based FPTAS via dynamic program to achieve a multiplicative -
approximation.
A.14 Proof of Lemma A.4
Proof of Lemma A.4. Note that for one item per stage case, the mechanism is truthful within any
stage t, if and only if uˆt(ξ, vt; vt) is increasing and convex in vt, and zt(ξ, vt) is the sub-gradient of
uˆt with respective to vt. It is equivalent to zt(ξ, vt) being non-negative and increasing in vt, and uˆt
being the integration of zt(ξ, vt) over vt.
zt(ξ, vt) is non-negative and increasing in vt, if and only if zt(ξ, vt) is a convex combination of
step functions, i.e.,
zt(ξ, vt) =
∫ +∞
0
wt(ξ, v) · I[vt ≥ v]dv =
∫ vt
0
wt(ξ, v)dv,
where
∫ +∞
0 wt(ξ, v)dv = 1 and wt(ξ, v) ≥ 0.
Particularly, for discrete types, to compute the optimal mechanism, we could assume that
wt(ξ, v) is non-zero only at points v
1
t , . . . , v
kt
t .
To prove this, for any v∗ such that vit < v∗ < v
i+1
t , we show that if wt(ξ, v
∗) > 0, we can
weakly improve the objective value without either breaking any constraint, or changing the values
of g(ξ, vit).
Let w′t(ξ, v) = wt(ξ, v) except for three points, i.e.,
w′t(ξ, v
i
t) = wt(ξ, v
i
t) +
vi+1t − v∗
vi+1t − vit
wt(ξ, v
∗),
w′t(ξ, v
i+1
t ) = wt(ξ, v
i
t) +
v∗ − vit
vi+1t − vit
wt(ξ, v
∗),
w′t(ξ, v
∗) = 0.
Then it is straightforward to verify the following facts.
w′t(ξ, v) ≥ 0,∫ +∞
0
w′t(ξ, v)dv =
∫ +∞
0
wt(ξ, v)dv = 1,
y′t(ξ, v
j
t ) =
∫ vjt
0
w′t(ξ, v)dv =
∫ vjt
0
wt(ξ, v)dv = yt(ξ, v
j
t ),∀j 6= i
y′t(ξ, v
i
t) =
∫ vit
0
w′t(ξ, v)dv =
∫ vit
0
wt(ξ, v)dv +
vi+1t − v∗
vi+1t − vit
wt(ξ, v
∗) > yt(ξ, vit),
uˆ′t(ξ, v
j
t ; v
j
t ) =
∫ vjt
0
y′t(ξ, v)dv =
∫ vjt
0
yt(ξ, v)dv = uˆt(ξ, v
j
t ; v
j
t ),∀j ≤ i
uˆ′t(ξ, v
j
t ; v
j
t ) =
∫ vjt
0
y′t(ξ, v)dv =
∫ vjt
0
yt(ξ, v)dv +
∫ vi+1t
vit
(
y′t(ξ, v)− yt(ξ, v)
)
dv
= uˆt(ξ, v
j
t ; v
j
t ),∀j ≥ i+ 1
=⇒g′(ξ, vjt ) = g(ξ, vjt ), ∀j
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where ∫ vi+1t
vit
(
y′t(ξ, v)− yt(ξ, v)
)
dv =
∫ vi+1t
vit
∫ v
0
(
w′t(ξ, ν)− wt(ξ, ν)
)
dνdv
=
∫ vi+1t
vit
∫ v
vit
(
w′t(ξ, ν)− wt(ξ, ν)
)
dνdv =
∫ vi+1t
vit
∫ vi+1t
ν
(
w′t(ξ, ν)− wt(ξ, ν)
)
dvdν
=
(
vi+1t − vit
) · (w′t(ξ, vit)− wt(ξ, vit))+ (vi+1t − v∗) · (w′t(ξ, v∗)− wt(ξ, v∗))
+
(
vi+1t − vi+1t
) · (w′t(ξ, vi+1t )− wt(ξ, vi+1t ))
=
(
vi+1t − vit
) · vi+1t − v∗
vi+1t − vit
wt(ξ, v
∗) +
(
vi+1t − v∗
) · (− wt(ξ, v∗))+ 0 = 0.
As desired, no constraint gets violated, but objective value gets improved.
A.15 Proof of Lemma A.6
Proof of Lemma A.6. Since ϕ is concave, hence βa ≥ βb. If they coincide, i.e., βa = βb, then we
are done, and ϕ must be the line segment that connects (a, ϕ(a)) and (b, ϕ(b)).
Otherwise, βa − βb > 0, and since |βa|, |βb| < +∞, βa − βb < +∞.
By adding a linear offset to ϕ, we assume WLOG that ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) = 0. Hence βa > 0 > βb.
Note that maxξ ϕ(ξ) min{ϕ(a), ϕ(b)} is not increased after adding the linear offset.
Then for any δ > 0, we make n queries to the evaluation oracle of ϕ at l1, . . . , lm, lm+1, . . . , ln,
where lm is the last point such that ϕ(lm−1) ≤ ϕ(lm) > ϕ(lm+1). Since ϕ is concave, such m is
unique.
Then points l1, . . . , lm are adaptively chosen according to the following equations, until ϕ starts
to decrease.
l0 = a, li = min{li−1 + δ/βi−1, b},
β0 = βa, βi =
ϕ(li)− ϕ(li−1)
li − li−1 −
ϕ(li)
li − b .
Since ϕ is concave, βi ≥ 0, and βi ≤ βa − βb < +∞. Hence li > li−1, as long as li−1 < b. Thus
m < +∞.
For the last half of points, lm+1, . . . , ln, are chosen similarly but in the reverse order, starting
from ln+1 = b until the next point is less than lm.
In the remainder of the proof, we show that m ≤ 2 maxξ ϕ(ξ)/δ + log(βa − βb)/(−βb), which
then implies that n ≤ 4 maxξ ϕ(ξ)/δ + log(βa − βb)2/(−βaβb).
Note that to achieve a given multiplicative approximation ratio κ, we can let δ = κ · ϕ(a+b2 ),
because 2ϕ(a+b2 ) ≥ maxξ ϕ(ξ) ≥ ϕ(a+b2 ).
Then by connecting points (a, ϕ(a)), (l1, ϕ(l1)), . . . , (ln, ϕ(ln)), (b, ϕ(b)), we get a lower bound ϕ
for ϕ, which is concave and piece-wise linear, and has at most n + 1 pieces. The upper bound is
simply ϕ(ξ) = ϕ(ξ) + δ.
From now on, we only consider 0 ≤ i ≤ m. For any li ≤ l ≤ li+1, ϕ(l) is δ-approximated by the
line segment that connects (li, ϕ(li)) and (li+1, ϕ(li+1)), i.e., by the concavity of ϕ,
ϕ(l) ≥ ϕ(li)(b− l)
b− li , ϕ(l) ≤
ϕ(li−1)(l − li)
li−1 − li +
ϕ(li)(li−1 − l)
li−1 − li .
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The gap between the upper and lower bounds of ϕ(l) is,
ϕ(li−1)(l − li)
li−1 − li +
ϕ(li)(li−1 − l)
li−1 − li −
ϕ(li)(b− l)
b− li
=
(
ϕ(li)− ϕ(li−1)
li − li−1 −
ϕ(li)
li − b
)
l +
(
ϕ(li)li−1 − ϕ(li−1)li
li−1 − li −
ϕ(li)b
b− li
)
= βil +
(
ϕ(li)li−1 − ϕ(li−1)li
li−1 − li −
ϕ(li)b
b− li
)
≤ βi(li + δ/βi) +
(
ϕ(li)li−1 − ϕ(li−1)li
li−1 − li −
ϕ(li)b
b− li
)
= δ + ϕ(li)− ϕ(li) = δ.
Then, we show that m is small, so the δ-approximation is achieved by a few of queries. Let β∗i
be defined as follows,
β∗i = βi +
ϕ(li)
li − b − βb ≥ βi +
βb(li − b)
li − b − βb = βi.
Note that ϕ(lm) > 0 = ϕ(b), hence lm < b, then for i ≤ m− 1,
βi =
ϕ(li)− ϕ(li−1)
li − li−1 −
ϕ(li)
li − b ≥
ϕ(li)− ϕ(li−1)
li − li−1 = β
∗
i − β∗i+1,
β∗i (li+1 − li) ≥ βi(li+1 − li) = βi ·
δ
βi
= δ,
=⇒ δ − (β∗i − β∗i+1 + βb)(li+1 − li) ≤ (β∗i+1 − βb)(li+1 − li) = ϕ(li+1)− ϕ(li),
=⇒ δ ≤ (β∗i − β∗i+1 + βb)(li+1 − li) + ϕ(li+1)− ϕ(li)
=
(β∗i − β∗i+1 + βb)δ
βi
+ ϕ(li+1)− ϕ(li),
=⇒ mδ ≤
m−1∑
i=0
(
(β∗i − β∗i+1 + βb)δ
βi
+ ϕ(li+1)− ϕ(li)
)
= ϕ(lm) + δ
m−1∑
i=0
β∗i − β∗i+1 + βb
βi
≤ max
ξ
ϕ(ξ) +
(m+ k)δ
2
=⇒ m ≤ 2 maxξ ϕ(ξ)
δ
+ k,
where there are at most k different i’s such that (β∗i − β∗i+1 + βb)/βi ≥ 1/2. Because
β∗i − β∗i+1 + βb
βi
≥ 1
2
=⇒ β∗i ≥ (βi − β∗i ) + 2β∗i+1 − 2βb ≥ 2β∗i+1.
Since for any i ≤ m − 1, β∗i ≤ βa − βb, β∗i+1 ≥ −βb, and β∗i ≥ β∗i+1, k must be no more than
log(βa − βb)/(−βb).
Combining with the last half of points, we have
n ≤ 4
δ
max
ξ
ϕ(ξ) + log
(βa − βb)2
−βaβb .
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